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1 Introduction
Firms often have an incentive to influence individuals tasked with deciding on behalf of or
advising a third party. Most prominently, firms may benefit from swaying the behavior of
their regulators, which can distort economic outcomes (e.g., see Stigler, 1971 and Laffont
and Tirole, 1991, 1993). To do so, firms can promise lucrative future job opportunities to
lenient regulatory officials. This practice, known as revolving door, appears to be rife in
developed countries and has long been the subject of a lively debate over the opportunity of
adopting measures to limit the transition of regulators to the private sector. Alternatively,
firms could directly pay a bribe to regulators in exchange for their leniency. These different
channels are often viewed as substitute tools for firms to capture their regulators.
In this paper, we develop a dynamic model to shed light on a crucial distinction
between bribes and the revolving door as means to influence the regulatory outcome,
which is tied to their different informational content and that has been overlooked so far.
The intuition is the following. Because formal exchanges of favors between regulatory
officials and regulated firms are prohibited, rewarding a friendly official can only take the
form of an informal promise. As there is no guarantee that the firm will keep its end of
the bargain, the regulator may refuse to be swayed. A firm may tremendously benefit
from publicly rewarding a compliant regulator, as this could signal to future regulators
that being accommodating pays off. Since the firm need not conceal its hiring decisions,
the revolving door can convey information about the firm’s eagerness and commitment
to reward friendly officials. Therefore, the public nature of the recruitment decision helps
facilitate collusive equilibria. By contrast, bribes are inherently private in nature because
of their illegality and, as such, do not help coordinate the firm’s and the regulators’
behavior. Making the bribe publicly observable is also unappealing to the firm since it
may trigger an investigation and, ultimately, overturn a favorable regulatory decision.
Conversely, the firm could convincingly argue in court that the reason behind hiring a
former regulator is his skillfulness and knowledge rather than his past lenient monitoring.
There is an additional, related reason for why bribes may be a poor substitute for the
revolving door: bribes necessarily require some explicit agreement between the collusive
partners. This implies that general anti-corruption practices, such as a whistleblowing
protection policy or a close scrutiny of the firm-regulator interaction, can successfully deter
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bribery. By contrast, the revolving-door channel may as well work implicitly: observing
past behavior and following industry norms suffice to inform the parties of the gains that
can be obtained by colluding. The absence of smoking-gun evidence renders standard
anti-corruption policies ineffective.
Although closing the revolving door can solve the problem of regulatory capture, we
caution that it can give rise to other inefficiencies, as already pointed out in the literature
and by many observers (e.g., Che, 1995). Firstly, it might actually be socially efficient that
some regulatory officials join the regulated firms as they could bring their industry know-
how and expertise to the private sector. Secondly, regulators may demand a lower salary
in the anticipation of landing highly-paid positions in the private sector after having
gained regulatory experience. These benefits would be lost if the revolving door were
closed. We demonstrate that a conditional restriction on post-agency employment can
mitigate these inefficiencies as it ensures that skilled regulators do not necessarily lose
out on appealing career opportunities, while at the same time it preserves the benefit of
deterring regulatory capture.
In the model, introduced in Section 2, we consider an infinitely repeated game between
a firm and a benevolent principal, where the latter can be thought of as the policymaker.
In every period, a regulatory decision that affects the firm’s payoff and social welfare must
be taken. The principal designs the regulatory policy, but must delegate the collection
of information about a time-varying state variable, which is critical for the regulatory
decision, to a regulatory agency. To carry out its monitoring activities, the regulatory
agency employs experts who, unlike the firm and the principal, are short-lived. The ex-
perts may sometimes be able to hide and not report the collected evidence. The principal
can offer experts a bonus contract that rewards them for reporting evidence and/or close
the revolving door, that is, prohibiting them from joining the regulated firm afterward.
In Section 3, we show that the revolving door can be kept open if the firm-agency
interaction is one-off or if it is repeated but the firm is not patient enough. If so, the
firm’s promise of rewarding an accommodating expert is not credible. Conversely, when
interaction is repeated and the firm is sufficiently patient, the promise of a future em-
ployment may influence the experts’ reports. The principal can deter regulatory capture
by offering a high bonus for reporting evidence or by closing the revolving door. In the
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latter case, we highlight that the revolving door should only be closed if the expert fails
to provide evidence: such policy, that we refer to as conditional ban, effectively deters
regulatory capture while retaining part of the benefits associated with the transfer of
regulatory expertise from the agency to the private sector. Notably, the conditional ban
is especially valuable when the firm is very patient or when there is frequent firm-agency
interaction: in that case, the firm would be willing to offer a high salary to accommodat-
ing experts, thereby making it overly expensive for the principal to use a bonus scheme
to deter capture.
Our basic mechanism and chief policy prescription extend to a variety of settings,
including environments in which the firm can observe or affect the state of the world (see
Subsection 4.1 and Subsection 4.3, respectively), or where an expert must exert effort to
collect any information (Section 4.2). The conditional ban proves particularly appealing
when the expert must incur an effort cost to collect evidence, whereas it is less appealing
when the firm can affect the state of the world with its actions. In the latter case, a
conditional ban provides perverse incentives for the firm to under-invest so that it can
hire an expert more often.
Moreover, we analyze a number of extensions that let us unveil additional results that
may be helpful in designing policies. Firstly, we highlight in Subsection 4.4 that the
principal may prefer to hire experts who are less able to obtain an accurate signal about
the state of the world so as to reduce the firm’s temptation to engage in capture or lower
the cost of capture deterrence.
Secondly, rather than prohibiting an expert from ever joining the private sector, the
principal may opt for a temporary restriction, i.e., a cooling-off period. In our setting,
we find that a finite cooling-off period will be used only to reduce the cost of the bonus
scheme and, if adopted, its length should be conditional on the expert’s report. Capture
becomes less appealing to the firm-expert coalition when sending a report favorable to the
firm kicks in the employment restriction. For this reason, a conditional cooling-off period
reduces the bonus needed to induce truthful reporting. Moreover, we show that wrongly
timed cooling-off periods may hurt all involved players and we caution that cooling-off
periods uniform across many regulatory agencies and, hence, industries are unlikely to be
optimal (see Subsection 4.5).
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Thirdly, although the baseline model assumes that an expert only makes one report,
in Subsection 4.6 we show that the gist of our results carries over to an environment
wherein each expert interacts several times with the regulated firm when working for the
agency and sends reports sequentially. We show that it may suffice to condition the ban
on the content of some and not all the reports. When this is the case, the ban should
better be made contingent on the content of early rather than late reports. To understand
why, consider that the firm may always try to capture an expert for the first reports if
only late reports are considered to determine whether the revolving door is open or not.
Conversely, if early reports are critical to determining an expert’s chance of joining the
regulated firm afterward, the firm can try to engage in capture only when the first reports
were unfavorable.
Lastly, in Subsection 4.7, we allow for an exogenous enforcement mechanism that
compels the experts and the firm to abide by what they agree upon in an explicit side-
contract. We find that the firm will resort to either bribes or the revolving door to
capture experts and that the former will be used whenever their associated transaction
cost is sufficiently low, even when players are very patient so that the firm could also use
the revolving-door channel. Our analysis highlights the importance of complementarities
among anti-capture policies: some measures that deter bribery (respectively, the use of
the revolving door) may in fact lead the firm to use the revolving door (use bribes) to
capture experts. Our results may account for why bribery is prevalent in the developing
world, whereas the revolving door is rife in wealthier countries. In the former, experts’
conduct is often ineffectively monitored and there is limited social stigma associated with
explicit corruption. In the latter, superior monitoring, better enforcement, and social
norms mitigate the threat of bribery, but the longer life-span of firms reinforces the
credibility of promises to reward lenient experts.
Section 5 provides some concluding remarks. All proofs are relegated to the appendix.
We now discuss the related theoretical literature and empirical evidence.
Related theoretical literature. The economics literature has long recognized how
the risk of collusion between a firm and the regulator entrusted with its supervision can
undermine the regulatory outcome. The contract-theory literature pioneered by Tirole
(1986) shows that collusion can be prevented by rewarding the regulatory officials for
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revealing information which can hurt the firm.1 In this strand of the literature, it is
typically assumed that the firm and the agency can strike an enforceable collusive agree-
ment.2 One of the purposes of our model is to focus on one of the channels that can make
such collusive agreement self-enforceable, namely reputation, and study in great detail its
repercussions for regulation outcomes and for the design of policies to prevent capture or
alleviate its most harmful effects. In this regard, our paper is linked to Martimort (1999),
who also analyzes the dynamics of regulation. Like him, we consider self-enforcing agree-
ments between the firm and the regulator and we posit that the principal cannot commit
to future transfers to the regulator. There are some relevant modeling differences as Mar-
timort (1999) assumes that all players are long-lived and characterizes the collusive-proof
regulatory contract, whereas in our model the principal may prefer not to prevent capture
and there is an infinite stream of short-lived regulators. More fundamentally, the goals
of the papers are different. Martimort (1999) aims to explain why the regulatory process
becomes less efficient over time and to endogenize the transaction costs of side-contracts.
By contrast, we are interested in studying the mechanism whereby regulators are swayed
by the firms and we highlight the trade-offs that preventing capture bring about.
Some theoretical papers have explicitly focused on both the upsides and the drawbacks
of the revolving-door practice. Salant (1995) shows how revolving doors could facilitate
cooperation between managers and regulators, leading to higher investments and increas-
ing social welfare. Che (1995) studies the relationship between a regulator’s performance
and revolving doors. He shows how post-agency employment opportunities can affect the
regulator’s ex-ante incentives to acquire regulatory expertise and his ex-post incentives to
favor the regulated firm. We also highlight the pros and cons of revolving door and we
also come to the conclusion that tolerating collusion may be beneficial, though for differ-
ent reasons. Specifically, allowing collusion may prompt monitoring effort in Che (1995),
whereas it can reduce the regulatory cost in our paper. However, Che (1995) considers a
one-off interaction between the players and the revolving door is only one of the possible
1Recent contributions to the design of regulation in the presence of corruption concerns include Drugov
(2010), Hiriart et al. (2010), Hiriart and Martimort (2012), Angelucci and Russo (2017), Ortner and
Chassang (2018), and De Chiara and Manna (2019).
2Mechanisms such as emotions, reciprocity, and reputation are often invoked to justify the enforce-
ability of this side-contract (for instance, see Tirole, 1992).
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mechanisms that the firm and the regulator can rely on to collude in his model, whereas
it plays a more prominent role in our paper, as formally shown by distinguishing between
different channels.
Although the foci of the papers are different, the basic mechanism in our model shares
some similarities with the one in Chassang and Padró I Miquel (2019). They show that
publicly available information enables a firm to credibly threaten to retaliate against a
whistleblower, whereas we highlight how a firm could use the principal’s authorization
decision to credibly and publicly reward a lenient expert. Moreover, like intimidation in
their model, in ours capture does not require an explicit side-agreement between the firm
and the expert.
There is also a link with two recent papers that develop dynamic games. First, Troya-
Martinez and Wren-Lewis (2018) study relational contracts between an agent and a super-
visor where there is room for corruption, highlighting the differences with more standard
principal-agent models. Second, Barron and Guo (2021) study the related issue of extor-
tion in a model where a principal interacts with an infinite stream of agents. The agents’
ability to commit to public messages enables agents to blackmail the principal and can
fully destroy cooperation.
Moreover, this paper contributes to the credence goods literature (Darby and Karni,
1973; Dulleck and Kerschbamer, 2006). In particular, it extends the small literature
that views the policymaker as the party that is seeking advice from an expert (Dulleck
et al., 2015). It also adds to the literature on commissions and kickbacks (Inderst and
Ottaviani, 2012a,b,c, and Inderst, 2015) in the sense that another party – here the firm –
may influence the expert’s choice.
Empirical evidence. There is a growing body of empirical evidence investigating the
effects of revolving door, thanks to the increasing availability of detailed datasets on work-
ers’ transition from regulatory agencies to the private sector (and vice versa). There is
evidence that the revolving door is both associated with capture and incentives to acquire
or signal expertise and skills that can result in superior regulatory outcomes. Concerning
suggestive evidence of capture, Tabakovic and Wollmann (2018) study the career tra-
jectory of examiners working for the USPTO who evaluate the patent applications filed
by law firms on behalf of inventors. Among other things, they find that (i) examin-
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ers award more patents to the law firms they end up working for; (ii) the difference is
significantly less pronounced when the likelihood of being hired is lower for exogenous
reasons (e.g., recessions); (iii) the patents awarded to the law firms they later work for
receive substantially fewer citations, indicating that these applications are held to a lower
standard. Recently, suggestive evidence of regulatory capture has been found in the in-
surance solvency regulation (Tenekedjieva, 2019), for credit rating analysts (Cornaggia
et al., 2016), and even for scientists working for the FDA advisory committees and panels
(Piller, 2018). Notably, firms-regulators interaction is regular and relatively frequent in
all these industries: over the 15 years considered by Tabakovic and Wollmann (2018),
at least six law firms filed more than 10,000 applications (and at least 21 law firms filed
more than 1,000); FDA advisory committees regularly meet with representatives of large
pharmaceutical corporations, and credit rating analysts rate securities of large underwrit-
ing merchant banks. Lastly, while financial exams of insurance firms may be ordered less
frequently, they must be performed at least once every five years.
Other papers have found evidence pointing to an incentive effect: for instance, Kempf
(2020) finds that more accurate credit rating analysts working for Moody’s are more
likely to join the underwriters.3 Focusing on Brazilian health procurement, Barbosa and
Straub (2017) find that civil servants who later join private providers purchase products
at a lower price, whereas the transition of workers from providers to the administration
appears detrimental as it is associated with larger purchases from the connected provider
at higher prices. DeHaan et al. (2015) find that more aggressive enforcement effort (e.g.,
collecting higher damages or seeking criminal proceedings against companies accused of
accounting misrepresentation) are weakly associated with those SEC lawyers who later
join law firms, especially those who specialize in SEC enforcement cases, although those
lawyers who will be based in Washington, D.C., tend to be laxer.
Also relevant for our paper is the empirical literature on the lobbying process which
has shown that, besides their technical knowledge and expertise, lobbyists are valuable in
that they bring connections, namely special interest access to legislators (Bertrand et al.,
2014). Accordingly, prior experience in the federal government is especially sought-after
3Kempf (2020) also finds some evidence of capture as more optimistic analysts on some specific deals,
that is, those who give ratings that are biased upwardly as compared to their counterparts at S&P and
Fitch, are more likely to be hired by one of the underwriting investment banks.
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because of the network of friends and colleagues that a revolving-door lobbyist may have
developed (Blanes i Vidal et al., 2012). We put forward a complementary mechanism
that renders the recruitment of former regulators or government employees particularly
appealing: it enables the regulated firm to signal its intent to reward accommodating
regulators (the creation of the industry norm) and ensures the monitoring of its promises,
which is critical for sustaining a collusive equilibrium.
2 Model
We consider a model with an infinitely-lived, profit-maximizing firm (it), an infinitely-
lived, welfare-maximizing principal (she), and an infinite stream of wealth-constrained,
short-lived experts (he). In each period, the firm can produce a new good that generates
a private benefit G > 0. The principal decides whether or not to authorize production,
since this can cause unverifiable damages to third parties. Specifically, if the state is safe,
i.e., θ = S, damages do not occur. If the state is unsafe, i.e., θ = U , production generates
damages D > 0. The state is unsafe with probability q > 0 and we assume that:
D > G > qD.
Therefore, it would be socially desirable if production were authorized only in the safe
state and, without knowing the state, it would be better to authorize production. Whether
production brings about damages is not known, whereas the probability distribution of
the states of the world is common knowledge.
The principal regulates the firm through a dedicated agency. In every period, an
expert is employed at the agency and tasked with collecting a signal about θ. If θ = S,
the signal is always uninformative, i.e., s = ∅. Conversely, if θ = U , the signal reveals
the true state of the world. The signal is privately observed by the expert, whereas the
principal and the firm only know its distribution. The expert sends a public report r to
the principal. We assume that the expert cannot forge information, that is, if s = ∅, r = ∅,
which is the case if the expert needs to provide verifiable evidence along with a report
r. However, if s = U , the expert can conceal information at a private concealment cost
c, whose magnitude depends on the nature of the information and thus becomes known
only after the expert has collected the signal. For simplicity, we assume that this cost
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can take two levels, c ∈ {c,∞}, with c ≥ 0. It is common knowledge that c = ∞ with
probability η ∈ (0, 1). We say that (regulatory) capture occurs when the expert reports
r = ∅, although s = U .
At the beginning of the game, the principal commits to an authorization policy as a
function of the report, and this decision is denoted xr ∈ {0, 1}, where x = 1 if production
is allowed and x = 0 if production is prohibited. The principal also pays a bonus βr ≥ 0
to the experts, which is contingent on the report.4 This payment generates a socially
costly shadow cost of public funds λβr, where λ ≥ 0, that can be due to inefficiencies
in tax collection or to the political resentment over rewards paid to civil servants.5 We
assume that the principal cannot commit to a sequence of regulatory transfers.
After sending the report, the expert can seek post-agency employment. The firm
can make a wage offer w, possibly as a function of the report that the expert made. We
assume that the expert makes a positive contribution to the industry after having gathered
experience in the regulatory agency. Specifically, an expert increases the firm’s profits by
v and could yield an outcome ū to other public or private institutions in the industry,
with v ≥ ū ≥ 0. Plausibly, while both the regulated firm and other organizations in the
same industry would be eager to employ an expert who has extensive knowledge of the
regulatory procedures, the former may especially value the expert’s relative familiarity
with the firm’s production process. Thanks to competition for the expert’s services, his
outside option after leaving the agency is equal to ū. We will refer to v as the value of
the regulatory expertise.
The timing of the stage game is as follows:
0. The principal commits to the authorization decision as a function of the report
xr ∈ {0, 1}.
1. Nature draws the state of the world θt and the concealment cost ct. The principal
sets the bonus scheme for the expert, βt(rt) ≥ 0.
2. If the expert accepts to work for the regulatory agency, he observes the signal st and
sends a public report rt to the principal who authorizes or not production according
4This reward can also come in the form of a promotion or a permanent salary increase.
5In many applications, the principal cannot make performance-dependent bonus payments (e.g., to
civil servants). Our model (with λ very large) encompasses these cases.
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to xr and pays the expert βt(rt).
3. The firm may make an offer wt to the expert, who can either accept this offer or
take up his outside option.
The repeated game we analyze involves the infinite repetition of the stage game starting
at stage 1. The principal and the firm use the same discount factor δ < 1, and we multiply
each period’s payoff by 1 − δ so as to obtain per-period averages. We will occasionally
interpret a small δ as infrequent interactions between the firm and the regulatory agency.6
We conclude this section by commenting on some of the modelling assumptions.
Firstly, the assumption that the signal s perfectly reveals the state of the world is solely
made to save on notation: qualitatively, all the main results carry trough if an expert
observes a signal that is not fully informative. Secondly, we assume that experts are
valuable to the regulated firm as well as other organizations in the industry after having
worked for the agency. Similarly, in the model of Bond and Glode (2014), working in a
regulatory agency leads to the accumulation of human capital that firms value. There is
also some empirical evidence supporting the human-capital accumulation formation hy-
pothesis (Blanes i Vidal et al., 2012). Lastly, akin to Martimort (1999), and for the same
purpose, we assume that the principal has limited commitment ability: she can commit
to an authorization policy but not to the wage policy. It stands to reason that the latter
cannot be modified as easily as the former. Its implication is that the principal cannot
preempt capture by committing to paying a large reward to a future expert to induce his
deviation from a collusive equilibrium. Such a reward would not be credible and, as a
result, if the principal wants to use the bonus scheme to prevent capture in period t, she
must offer a reward to that period’s expert.
3 Regulatory Capture via the Revolving Door
In this section, we impose that the principal cannot prevent the expert from joining the
firm after leaving the agency. We relax this assumption in Section 3.1.
6This is admittedly a loose interpretation of the discount factor. What we have in mind is that if
the players interact every n periods, the firm and the principal will discount the next interaction by δn,
which is the lower the higher n, and thus, the more infrequent those interactions are.
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First, note that the principal could obtain social welfare WNO = G−qD if she did not
hire any expert. Regulation is thus valuable in that it may bring about a benefit equal
to q(D − G) + v, which is attained if the principal sets xU = 0 < 1 = x∅, the experts
always report truthfully the observed signal, and they later join the regulated firm. If the
firm’s interaction with the regulatory agency is one-off, W FB = (1− q)G+ v, where FB
stands for first-best, is indeed the level of social welfare that regulation achieves without
having to reward an expert to induce truthful revelation. To see this, solve the stage game
backwards. In stage 3, the firm would always recruit the expert by offering a salary that
matches the one that other organizations in the industry would pay, i.e., w = ū. In stage
2, every expert would choose the report that maximizes his utility, which depends on the
bonus scheme and the concealment cost. To induce truthful revelation of the signal, the
principal can offer β∅ = βU = 0 in stage 1 and can announce x∅ = 1 and xU = 0 in stage
0. The firm’s expected profit in the stage-game is πSG = (1− q)G+ v − ū.
If the interaction with the regulatory agency is infinitely repeated, the firm may try
to capture the experts so as to improve upon πSG. Consider the following revolving-door
implicit contract, denoted by RD, starting at date t in which (i) experts always conceal
unfavorable evidence when the concealment cost is low, c = c, ; (ii) the firm rewards
experts who report r = ∅ with improved post-agency job prospects; (iii) if at period t+ l
the expert reported r = ∅ and the firm did not improve his job prospects, then at all t+ l′
with l′ ≥ l, the experts always reveal unfavorable evidence. The revolving-door implicit
contract is self-enforcing if these strategies form a Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium of the
continuation game.7
For the revolving-door implicit contract to be an equilibrium, the post-agency salary
must satisfy a set of participation and incentive constraints. In what follows, we restrict
attention to stationary equilibria,8 and, as a result, we drop the period subscript t. A first
necessary condition for the revolving-door implicit contract to be self-enforcing is that the
following firm’s dynamic capture-incentive compatibility constraint is satisfied:
(1− δ)(v − w∅) + δπRD ≥ (1− δ)(v − ū) + δπSG, (1)
7The notion of Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium enables us to consider experts’ beliefs about the salaries
they expect to receive from the firm. In equilibrium, experts will correctly anticipate the salary the firm
will offer for any bonus schedule provided by the principal and for any report they make.
8In Appendix A, we show that this is without loss of generality.
11
where πRD and πSG are the expected values of the streams of payoffs the firm obtains
if regulatory capture does and does not take place, respectively. In the latter case, the
firm receives the stage-game payoff in every period. If regulatory capture occurs, the firm
obtains G also whenever there is evidence that production is unsafe but the signal can be
manipulated, that is, with probability q(1 − η). However, the firm must pay the salary
w∅ whenever the report is favorable. As a result, the firm’s expected profit by adhering





(G− w∅)− qηwU + v.
It follows that:
∆π ≡ πRD − πSG = q(1− η)G− (1− qη)w∅ − qηwU + ū.
Importantly, if the firm deviates, it still finds it profitable to hire the expert as his con-
tribution to the firm’s profit is positive. However, in that case, the firm will not pay him
more than the expert’s ex-post outside option ū.
A second necessary condition for the revolving-door implicit contract to describe an
equilibrium is that the expert with a low concealment cost is willing to misreport evidence.
We thus write the following expert’s capture-incentive compatibility constraint:
w∅ − c+ β∅ ≥ wU + βU . (2)
The firm will hire an expert that has reported r = U with a salary wU = ū: in addition
to being beneficial to the firm, since v ≥ ū, this salary equals the expert’s ex-post out-
side option and does not make it more difficult to satisfy the expert’s capture-incentive
compatibility constraint.
The maximum w∅ that is self-enforcing is found from making the firm’s dynamic





If the concealment cost is sufficiently high, that is, c + ū ≥ wMax∅ , deterring capture is
costless. This condition can be rewritten as:




Now, suppose that capture is an issue because δ ≥ δ̃. The principal must decide whether
to deter or tolerate regulatory capture. If the principal does not prevent capture, she does
not reward experts, namely, βU = β∅ = 0, and welfare is
WRDtolerate = (1− qη)G+ v − q(1− η)(D + c). (4)
To understand why, notice that the firm expects to get (1 − qη)(G − c) + v − ū, where
w∅ = c + ū is the minimum salary that can induce an expert to conceal evidence. An
expert expects to obtain (1 − q)c + ū. The expert obtains a rent when he does not
manipulate evidence to make an empty report, that is, when s = ∅. While the salary is
merely a transfer from the firm to the experts, the concealment cost enters the welfare
expression whenever evidence is concealed. Note also that if η → 0, it might be optimal
for the principal to shut down the regulatory agency as the experts do not improve the
authorization outcome while bearing inefficient concealment costs. This is the case when
experts do not gain a lot of productivity at the regulatory agency, i.e., when v is negligible.
Bonus policy. If the principal deters capture, she must create a wedge between the
bonus the expert receives following a report that hurts the firm and the one following a
report that is favorable: βRDbonusU = w
Max
∅ − c− ū =
δq(1−η)G
1−δqη − c and β∅ = 0, and welfare
is:







Deterring capture through the bonus policy restores authorization efficiency but comes
at the cost of rewarding the experts whenever they report evidence that is unfavorable to
the firm. The following proposition describes the principal’s favorite solution.
Proposition 1. Suppose that the revolving door must be kept open.
(a) If δ < δ̃, regulatory capture is not an issue and the principal sets βU = β∅ = 0;
(b) if δ ≥ δ̃, regulatory capture is an issue and the principal deters capture by setting
βRDbonusU = w
Max
∅ − c− ū and βRDbonus∅ = 0 if and only if:
λ ≤ λ̂ ≡ (1− η)(1− δqη)(D −G+ c)
δq(1− η)G− (1− δqη)c
, (6)
where λ̂ is decreasing in δ. Otherwise, the principal does not prevent capture and sets
βU = β∅ = 0.
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When the discount factor is low, regulatory capture is not a problem as the maximum
salary the firm can credibly promise to offer is lower than the concealment cost. For
δ high enough, the implicit contract could be self-enforcing and this inevitably reduces
welfare. The principal may decide to prevent capture by offering monetary incentives to
the experts. The principal may refrain from doing so when this is more costly, i.e., when λ
is sufficiently high. Therefore, when paying high-powered incentives to experts faces more
political opposition and/or creates more inefficiencies, regulatory capture is more likely
to occur. The threshold value of λ above which the revolving-door implicit contract is
tolerated is decreasing in δ. To understand why, notice that the maximum salary that the
firm can credibly promise to pay to the experts is increasing in the discount factor, and so
is the bonus that the principal would have to pay to an expert that makes an unfavorable
report to discourage capture. In Figure 1, we graphically illustrate the parameter regions
where the three equilibria arise, depending on the values of λ and δ.9
Also note that regulatory capture becomes more of an issue if η, i.e., the probability of
a high concealment cost, decreases. Moreover, unless c is large, a decrease in η increases λ̂,
which increases the parameter range under which the principal deters capture by providing
a bonus. Thus, experts tend to benefit from a lower η both directly and indirectly.
3.1 Should We Close the Revolving Door?
One policy option that we have so far deliberately overlooked is that of closing the re-
volving door. Clearly, this solution prevents regulatory capture in our set-up, as the firm
would be unable to reward an accommodating expert. Yet, this solution is not without
costs if experts may make a genuinely valuable contribution to the firms they join. In this
subsection, we explore this trade-off more formally and put forward a novel option that
can alleviate the welfare costs associated with closing the revolving door while retaining
its benefit of deterring capture. Throughout, we will make the assumption that closing
the revolving door means that an expert is forbidden from joining any firm operating in













Figure 1: Welfare under optimal policies for different λ and δ when the principal cannot
close the revolving door.
the industry.10
Blanket ban. If the principal bans experts from joining the industry once they leave
the regulatory agency, there is no need to offer rewards to the experts to induce truthful
reporting. Welfare would be:
WRDblanketban = (1− q)G.
Like the high-reward option, closing the revolving door restores authorization efficiency.
However, this policy entails the social cost associated with forgoing the experts’ contri-
10To be truly effective, closing the revolving door should prohibit former experts from receiving any
direct or indirect compensation from firms in the regulated industry - not just the ones the expert directly
interacted with. Otherwise, experts may join or set up law firms, think tanks, or consulting firms and still
receive payments from previously regulated firms as reward for their friendliness. Coalitions of firms may
also take turns in hiring each other’s (regulatory) experts to avoid more lenient employment restrictions.
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bution to the industry.
Conditional ban. An alternative option the principal should entertain is that of open-
ing the revolving door conditionally on the information an expert reveals in his report.
Specifically, suppose that only an expert who reports r = U can later take up positions
in the industry and is otherwise banned from doing so. This induces an expert who has
obtained unfavorable information to reveal it, thereby preventing capture: a firm cannot
promise a future job to an accommodating expert, since the expert can later be hired only
if his report does not benefit the firm. This solution would ensure authorization efficiency
while alleviating the ex-post welfare cost that employment restrictions entail. Welfare
under this solution would be:
WRDconditionalban = (1− q)G+ qv,
which is strictly higher than WRDblanketban. If the principal wants to deter regulatory
capture, she will prefer selectively closing the revolving door to keeping it open and
relying on the bonus policy if and only if:










All factors which inflate the capture-preventing bonus, such as a lower concealment cost c,
a higher probability that information can be concealed 1−η, a higher profit associated with
authorization G, a higher likelihood that the state is unsafe q, and a higher discount factor
δ make a conditional ban more appealing. By contrast, a larger expert’s contribution
to the firm v and a lower inefficiency caused by paying a high salary to the expert λ
make the principal lean towards using bonuses to deter capture and keeping the revolving
door always open. Furthermore, selectively closing the revolving door strictly dominates
tolerating capture when
v ≤ ṽ ≡ q
1− q
(1− η)(D −G+ c).
Note that ṽ coincides with v̂ when λ = λ̂. Since v̂ is increasing in λ, the relevant condition
for the conditional ban to be the preferred policy is v < v̂ when λ ≤ λ̂ and v < ṽ when
λ > λ̂.
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The following proposition pins down the principal’s favorite solution when regulatory
capture is an issue. It is straightforward to show that keeping the revolving door open
is socially beneficial if the interaction is sporadic (i.e., in the one-shot game) or the
players are not sufficiently patient (δ < δ̃) so that regulatory capture does not represent
a concern.11
Proposition 2. Suppose that δ ≥ δ̃.
1. If λ ≤ λ̂, the principal prevents regulatory capture by
(a) selectively closing the revolving door if v < v̂;
(b) using the bonus policy if v ≥ v̂.
2. If λ > λ̂, the principal
(a) prevents capture by selectively closing the revolving door if v ≤ ṽ;
(b) tolerates capture if v > ṽ.
Deterring capture is worthwhile when the damages that an unsafe activity can give rise
to are substantial relative to the gains of prohibiting production. We have shown different
alternatives the principal should entertain when fighting capture. This can be achieved
directly by rewarding the expert who reports unfavorable evidence with a monetary bonus.
In this way, the expert acts as a bounty hunter, looking for bad evidence. Capture can also
be prevented indirectly, by prohibiting the firm from using the revolving door to reward
a friendly expert. This does not necessarily imply that experts cannot join the private
sector under any circumstances. In fact, we have shown that the principal should leave
the door open for those experts who reveal evidence that does not benefit the regulated
firm. In that case, it would be difficult to argue that the firm’s recruitment of the expert
is part of a shady do ut des scheme.
Figure 2 illustrates the regions of parameter values where the different policy options
are optimally chosen by the principal as a function of v and δ.12 A conditional ban
11See Proposition 7 in the appendix for the analog of Proposition 2 for the case in which the signal s
is not always informative when θ = U .
12The figure is drawn using the following parameter values: q = 0.5, η = 0.8, c = 0.5, G = 20, D = 30,
and λ = 1. Further note that δ̂ is derived from λ̂ when the above values for the parameters are used.
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is preferred when δ is relatively large as compared to v. Intuitively, by increasing the
monetary reward needed to deter capture, a higher δ reduces the attractiveness of the
bonus scheme. This suggests that the usefulness of the conditional ban is greater in
industries where there is frequent firm-regulatory agency interaction. All the more so













Figure 2: Welfare under optimal polices for different v and δ when the principal can close
the revolving door.
3.2 Revolving Door versus Implicit Bribes
In this subsection, we aim to shed light on the critical role played by the revolving door in
sustaining regulatory capture as an equilibrium phenomenon. To this end, suppose that
the firm implicitly promises to pay a bribe b to an expert who reports r = ∅. While, at
first blush, this payment looks strikingly similar to the wage, there is a crucial difference:
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being illegal, the bribe cannot be made public. As a result, only the expert who receives
the bribe and the firm observe whether it has been paid or not. Consider a bribery implicit
contract akin to the revolving-door implicit contract described earlier, with the difference
that a bribe is paid instead of a post-agency wage. We obtain the following result.
Proposition 3. There does not exist a self-enforcing bribery implicit contract which in-
duces the experts to conceal evidence.
The reason why the implicit promise of a bribe cannot induce the experts to conceal
evidence lies in the private nature of this illegal payment. As the period t + l expert,
with l = 1, 2, ... observes the report sent by the period t expert but not whether or not
he received the promised bribe, let alone its size, the period t + l expert has no way of
knowing whether the firm stands by its promises. As bribing an expert would not affect
future experts’ beliefs and behavior, the firm does not have an incentive to follow through
on the promised payment. Hence, no positive bribe can credibly be promised.
This result is robust to contemplating a different timing of the bribe and, with some
qualifications, to allowing experts to exchange messages. As for the first point, suppose
that the firm pays the bribe before the expert sends the report. In this case, the expert
who has already pocketed the bribe lacks the incentive to manipulate evidence whenever
∆β ≡ βU − β∅ ≥ 0. Stated differently, it is the expert’s capture-incentive compatibility
constraint that would not be satisfied: no matter what he reports, this does not affect the
payment he receives from the firm. Hence, the expert would only take into account the
bonus differential and the manipulation cost in choosing his report. If ∆β = 0 and c is
strictly positive, reporting truthfully the collected evidence would be strictly dominant.
As for the experts’ ability to exchange messages, this could be used to coordinate
punishments, facilitating capture by ensuring that a firm that deviates in a given period
is punished in the continuation game. We obtain the following remark.
Remark 1. Suppose that, in each period t, the period t expert can send a message mt that
is observed by all future experts. Then, the bribery implicit contract may be self-enforcing.
Note that it is not necessary that the message can be observed by all future experts:
if only the next period’s expert can observe each expert’s message, a similar strategy as
above works, in which the message sent also depends on the previous expert’s message.
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There are some caveats to this logic, though. Firstly, if experts could commit to
messages before sending the report to the principal, the regulatory capture equilibrium
could unravel. This is because the experts could blackmail the firm, fully extracting
the firm’s surplus under the threat of spreading information that the firm deviated, as
formally shown in a different setting by Barron and Guo (2021), to which we refer the
interested reader.
Secondly, it must be that the principal cannot observe or at least cannot verify the
messages that experts exchange. Otherwise, the principal could have proof that corruption
has occurred and could then take some appropriate measures to tackle it. Unlike the bribe,
offering a reward to an expert in the form of a well-paid job gives the firm a justification
that can hold up in court: the firm could always argue that it has hired the expert for his
skills and expertise and not to reward his possibly lenient behavior during his term at the
regulatory agency. In practice, this would make it harder for the principal to condition
her regulatory decision on this observation. While the firm could increase the bribe, so as
to make up for the risk of being caught by the principal, such a bribery implicit contract,
though self-enforcing, would not exactly replicate the equilibrium outcome described for
the revolving door. It would be more costly to implement for the firm, which would thus
prefer the revolving-door equilibrium.
That being said, when the revolving door is closed, a firm may resort to bribes to
capture experts. An implication of Remark 1 is that what types of bribes are used
depends on how authorities react to observing potential signals of bribes. If a visible bribe,
such as an expert driving a fancy car he could hardly afford given his wage, triggers an
investigation, bribes would likely be hidden. However, if authorities would not act upon
such signals, a firm would choose very visible bribes in order to show everyone that it
keeps its promises.
This subsection has allowed us to highlight that bribes cannot substitute for the re-
volving door as a tool to sustain regulatory capture as an equilibrium phenomenon. The
public nature of the recruitment decision enables the firm to signal its eagerness to reward
friendly experts and acts as a commitment device. Being publicly observed, the firm has a
powerful incentive to make good on its implicit promise. Importantly, the capture mech-
anism we have described works in a way that is not typically emphasized by academics,
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policy makers, and observers: a firm that provides friendly experts with lucrative job
opportunities may be driven by the desire to signal to future experts that they could earn
rents by being accommodating rather than by an inclination to positively reciprocate past
favors. Then, the existence of future rents is crucial for regulatory capture to occur.
3.3 Discussion
In this subsection, we discuss the role of some of our key assumptions and briefly explore
the scope of the chief policy prescriptions arising out of our analysis.
Extortion. In the model, we have suggested that the revolving door should be kept
open depending on the evidence that the expert reveals. If an expert makes a report
that cannot be deemed friendly to the regulated firm, the occurrence of capture can be
excluded and, as a result, there is no reason to prohibit the expert from joining the private
sector after leaving the agency. A possible limitation to this suggested solution arises if
an expert could forge evidence that harms the regulated firm. If so, both a reward policy
that sets βU > β∅ and the conditional ban might backfire and may result in framing and
extortion (e.g., Khalil et al., 2010 show that a reward to prevent collusion can lead to
extortion by making the threat of framing credible). To avoid this undesirable outcome,
an expert’s damning report should be based on objective evidence that could be reviewed
by other experts or hold up in a court of law, if the firm decides to appeal the unfavorable
decision and turn to the judicial authority. Indeed, provisions to avoid an unfairly or
unjust treatment of applicants are in place in both the U.S. and Europe. There, patent
applicants and drugmakers seeking marketing authorization whose applications have been
rejected can request the evidence to be reviewed by different experts.13 Such provisions
substantially diminish the expert’s framing ability.
13For instance, in the U.S. an applicant for a patent can appeal to the Patent Trial and Appeal Board
if their claims have been twice rejected (U.S. Code, Title 35, Section 134). In Europe, Part VI of the
Convention on the Grant of European Patents establishes the appeals procedure. As for the evaluation of
medicines, the European Medicines Agency provides a step-by-step procedure for marketing authorization
applications that include the right for the developer to appeal an unfavorable decision, in which case new
experts are appointed to evaluate the available evidence.
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Partially-verifiable reports. In our model, we have assumed that damages are non-
verifiable and, as a result, the principal does not know whether a favorable report was is-
sued because production was indeed safe or because evidence of its unsafety had been con-
cealed. As said, a remarkable feature of the revolving-door equilibrium is that experts-firm
collusion can take place without leaving a smoking gun behind, rendering many standard
anti-corruption policies ineffective. However, with some delay, the principal may learn
whether production authorized in a given period hurt someone. For instance, depend-
ing on the activity, there might emerge evidence of local contamination, anti-competitive
behavior, or other types of non-compliance with regulations or there might be accidents.
When this happens, the principal may revoke the incorrectly-given authorization. This
does not affect the general thrust of our analysis, although it may reduce the appeal of
policies which involve the closure of the revolving door.
To see this, suppose that with some positive probability the principal learns the true
θ and, if r = ∅ when θ = U , the firm and/or the expert who filled the inaccurate report
are punished. For instance, the firm may lose G and the expert may be fined and/or
his reputation tarnished. Ex-post detection of the true state of the world makes it more
complicated to sustain capture. This is because the firm’s expected profit from engaging in
regulatory capture is diminished (e.g., if the authorization may be revoked) and the expert
is more reluctant to conceal unfavorable evidence (if his reputation may take a hit and his
wallet lightened). There can also be a complementarity between running investigations
of suspiciously favorable reports and the use of bonuses to prevent regulatory capture.
4 Extensions
In what follows we extend the baseline model in several directions. All proofs and most
technical details are provided in Appendix B.
4.1 Firm Able to Observe Signal or State
What if the firm also observes the same signal as the expert or knows the (current) state
of the world? If the firm does not observe the signal and just knows, but cannot condition
its wage on, the state of the world, our analysis does not change. We assume that the
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firm is not able to make the wage dependent on the state of the world. This assumption
seems plausible in a real-world setting in which damages might be rare and only revealed
in the long-run, even if θ = U .
Remark 2. If the firm knows the state of the world or observes the expert’s signal,
Propositions 1 and 2 apply.
Note that if there are different types of experts, as in Subsection 4.4, and types are
not observable, the firm learns something about the expert’s type when it observes the
expert’s signal. This makes it harder to commit to hire an expert that did not find
unfavorable evidence, but does not change our results qualitatively.14
4.2 Effort Necessary for Expert to Observe Signal
So far, we have assumed that experts automatically observe if θ = U . We now analyze
the case in which an expert must make an effort to learn whether the state is unsafe.
Specifically, before learning his concealment cost c, the expert privately chooses e ∈ {0, 1}
at cost cee. If he does not exert effort (e = 0), the signal is always uninformative. If he
exerts effort (e = 1), the signal is informative. If the principal wants to implement e = 1,




≤ η[ū+ βU ] + (1− η)[max{ū+ βU ,max{w∅, ū}+ β∅ − c}].
Naturally, the principal would not want to implement e = 1, if the unsafe state is very
unlikely, the effort cost is very high, or she tolerates capture anyway. The principal
can provide incentives to acquire information via βU or let them be provided by future
wages. Remarkably, the conditional ban presents the additional advantage of motivating
information acquisition, as an expert may look for (unfavorable) evidence so as to get
access to lucrative job opportunities in the industry thereafter.
Welfare is not directly comparable to the previous subsections, of course. Either the
principal induces e = 1, in which case effort costs occur; or the principal does not do so,
14Also see Subsection 5.3 of an earlier version of this paper, De Chiara and Schwarz (2020).
15If there are employment restrictions, the according wages become zero.
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in which case there are not only no effort costs but also no concealment costs for experts
who do not report unfavorable evidence.
The following proposition pins down the principal’s favorite solution for the case in
which the expert has an effort cost for acquiring information. Preventing capture only by
means of a reward scheme may be more expensive in that case. This makes the policy of
opening the revolving door conditional on an unfavorable report more desirable.
Proposition 4. Suppose an expert has to exert effort to potentially observe an informative
signal. If
qG+ ce > qD −max{(1− q)v + λqβRDconditionalbanUEffort , λqβRDdeterUEffort}, (7)










and βRDconditionalbanUEffort = max{ce/q − ū, 0},
then the principal tolerates regulatory capture. By contrast, if (7) does not hold, the
principal deters capture with a high bonus if v > λ q
1−q (β
RDdeter
UEffort − βRDconditionalbanUEffort ) and by
selectively closing the revolving door otherwise.
4.3 Moral Hazard on Safety Care
The firm may take actions that affect the probability that the state of the world is safe.
For example, in the case of environmental regulation, the firm can devote resources to
comply with the existing laws and rules. In the appendix, we develop an extension to
the baseline model in which we endogenize the state of the world. This extension makes
our model similar to the work on moral hazard on safety care (e.g., Hiriart et al., 2010)
or crime prevention (e.g., Ortner and Chassang, 2018) where, in addition to inducing
truthful reporting, the principal wants to prompt the firm to take the desired action. We
find that the conditional ban may give rise to perverse incentives as the firm may under-
invest in safety so as to increase its chances of being able to hire an expert afterward.
This shortcoming is more likely to arise when the specific knowledge that the expert
could bring to the firm, v − ū, and the compliance cost are relatively large as compared
to the benefits generated by a positive report G. By contrast, the bonus policy does not
suffer from this downside and can provide optimal incentives to invest and deter capture,
although its convenience decreases in the compliance cost.
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4.4 Experts versus Bureaucrats
Suppose that the principal can assign the task of collecting information about the state
θ to a different type of officials, that we henceforth call bureaucrats. Unlike experts,
bureaucrats may fail to observe that the state is unsafe and the value of their expertise to
the private sector may be lower. In particular, let us assume that a bureaucrat observes
s = U when θ = U with probability ε < 1. Therefore, with probability qε a bureaucrat
observes s = U , whereas with complementary probability 1 − qε, he observes s = ∅.
Moreover, by joining the private sector at the end of his term at the agency, a bureaucrat
can increase the profit of the regulated firm and that of other organizations by vB and
ūB, respectively, with vB ≥ ūB ≥ 0, vB ≤ v, and ūB ≤ ū. In each period, the principal
decides whether to hire a bureaucrat or an expert and their type is publicly observable.
In practice, regulatory agencies may assign specialized experts to monitor the firm or,
alternatively, they may rely on employees who have a less profound understanding of
the industry. Because of observability, there is no reason to hire a mix of experts and
bureaucrats.
As we show in the appendix, the principal may decide to employ bureaucrats rather
than experts in two distinct, though related, cases. Firstly, for intermediate values of δ,
capture is an issue if the principal employs experts, but not if she employs bureaucrats.
This is because the firm may be more reluctant to engage in capture if there is already a
high probability that the officials will not collect unfavorable information. In that region,
it is desirable to employ bureaucrats unless the efficiency loss due to their employment is
too sizable. Secondly, when capture is prevented via the bonus policy, the principal may
prefer to employ bureaucrats to save on the total wage bill: the bonus needed to deter
capture as well as the probability of paying it is lower when the signal is collected by
bureaucrats instead of experts. By contrast, the principal always prefers to hire experts
when capture is tolerated or when capture is deterred by selectively closing the revolving
door. Employing bureaucrats would only magnify the welfare losses (i.e., the reduction
in the value added of the officials to the private sector and the probability that an unsafe
product is authorized) with no offsetting benefit in return.
By contrast, when neither the firm nor the principal knows the official’s type, e.g.,
when the monitoring task is assigned to a new recruit. Then, regulatory capture is more
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difficult to implement when the official’s ability to find evidence unfavorable to the firm
is positively correlated with the value of the official’s regulatory expertise to the industry.
Intuitively, concealing information worsens the official’s job prospect as he foregoes the
opportunity to signal his ability to the industry.16
4.5 Cooling-off Periods
In this subsection, we examine how post-employment restrictions affect the results of our
analysis. In many countries, after leaving governmental agencies, experts are temporarily
prohibited from joining firms or organizations in the industry they used to regulate.17
An implication of such restrictions, which are also known as cooling-off periods, is that
firms’ and experts’ benefits from employment are delayed. To account for this effect in
our set-up, we now assume that the payoffs that the firm (or other industry players) and
the expert can obtain from the employment relationship in stage 3 are evaluated by the
factor 1
1+γ
in stage 2. The term γ ∈ [0,∞) reflects the employment restrictions, which is
the principal’s choice variable. Thus far, we have confined attention to two polar policies:
that in which an expert can freely join other firms or organizations once his term at the
regulatory agency is over (i.e., γ = 0), and that in which an expert is banned from joining
the industry after leaving the agency (γ =∞).
If the principal sets out to thwart capture, besides the conditional ban and the bonus
policy, she may decide to set γ high enough, and can use this policy tool in combination
with the reward scheme. In the same fashion as the conditional ban, the principal could
also contemplate making the length of the cooling-off period conditional on the expert’s
report. When considering this option, we will assume that an expert can join the industry
without delay if r = U , whereas there might be a cooling-off period if r = ∅.
Employment restrictions should not be imposed if interaction is one-off, as they would
only reduce welfare. Notice that W SGcool = (1− q)G+ q1selectv+
(1−q1select)v
1+γ
, where 1select is
an indicator function that takes value 1 if the cooling-off period is conditional on r = ∅.
It is immediate to see that this welfare expression is decreasing in γ. Recall that capture
requires an explicit agreement when regulatory interaction is infrequent. As such, it is
16Also see an earlier version of this paper, De Chiara and Schwarz (2020).
17We provide a summary of the most important employment restrictions in the U.S. and Europe in
Appendix B.5.
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better prevented by other anti-corruption policies which rely on seeking out some hard
evidence that can be used as a smoking gun.
Consider frequently repeated interaction now. The firm has the opportunity to renege
on the implicit understanding with the expert once the cooling-off period is over. As a
result, the expression for the firm’s dynamic capture-incentive compatibility constraint is
unchanged:
(1− δ)[v − w∅] + δπRDcool ≥ (1− δ)(v − ū) + δπSGcool.
Conversely, the expert’s capture incentive compatibility constraint must be amended.
At the time he can conceal evidence, the expert anticipates that he will not be able to
immediately join the industry after leaving the agency:
1
1 + γ








max{wU , ū}+ βU . (8)
If the principal tolerates capture, γ = 0. Intuitively, there is no point in delaying the time
at which the firm can hire the expert if capture is not prevented. If capture is prevented,
the principal chooses γ to maximize welfare:




By inspecting the welfare expression, we can already conclude when the principal may
want to use the cooling-off period.
Remark 3. The principal may use the cooling-off period only to reduce the social cost of
the bonus scheme.
It is immediate to see that if βRDdeterU = 0, for instance, because c is high, an increase
in γ would decrease welfare exactly as in the case when there is no repeated interaction.
By itself, a finite cooling-off period does not affect the firm’s willingness to make good on
the promise to hire the accommodating expert. Thus, the only reason why the principal
may want to use this type of post-agency employment restriction is to reduce the bonus
she has to pay to an expert who reports r = U . The following proposition illustrates how
the cooling-off period should be used.
Proposition 5. When the cooling-off period is used, it is always efficient to condition
its length on the expert’s report. The optimal cooling-off period is increasing in G and γ,
whereas its relation with v and ū is ambiguous.
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The first striking result is that cooling-off periods should always be contingent on
the expert’s report and the reason is threefold. First, as an expert makes a valuable
contribution to the industry, it is desirable that the recourse to this employment restriction
be as limited as possible. Second, since the firm profits from employing the expert and
inducing concealment of unfavorable evidence kicks in the employment restriction, the
firm is less willing to engage in regulatory capture and, consequently, it can be deterred
more easily. Third, the opportunity cost of concealing unfavorable information is higher
for the expert, thereby lowering the bonus needed to induce truthful reporting.
When used, the length of the cooling-off period positively depends on G and λ as
these parameters can increase the benefit of reducing the social cost of paying a bonus.
When the value of the regulatory expertise v is higher, longer cooling-off periods have a
direct negative impact on welfare. However, a lower bonus is needed to deter regulatory
capture since this is less appealing to the firm, which benefits more from employing an
expert. Therefore, a higher v has an ambiguous effect on cooling-off periods.18 Because
the optimal length of the cooling-off period depends on various factors, it seems unlikely
that a uniform cooling-off period across regulatory agencies is optimal.
Also note that an expert always suffers from a higher γ because his outside option, to
which he is held, will decrease as he could take up a job in which his prior expertise is
valuable only later. Similarly, the firm’s profit will decrease because it can only employ
the experts later. If the cooling-off period is very long, these effects will outweigh the
efficiency improvements due to a lower bonus payment. This is so even without assuming
any deterioration in the value of the regulatory expertise due to the inability of working
for the industry for some time. Thus, a poorly-chosen length of a cooling-off period can
make everyone worse off.
4.6 Multiple per-period reports
In this subsection, we examine the design of capture-prevention tools in a setting in which
each expert interacts several times with the regulated firm. In particular, we focus on how
to adapt our suggested policy of conditionally-opening the revolving door in this more
18A higher ū has an ambiguous effect on the equilibrium level of γ too, but this is because ū has an
uncertain effect on the equilibrium bonus.
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complex environment. To keep the model tractable, and yet provide valuable insights,
we assume that each expert is asked to make two reports on two independent signals
associated with the safety of the firm’s activity. In practice, one could think of a firm
applying for two distinct licences or patents to the agency, or complying with two distinct
pieces of regulation. Below, we provide further details about the set-up and we illustrate
the main results that we obtain, while we relegate an extensive analysis of this environment
to Appendix B.6.
We assume that, in each period t, the firm independently draws two binary random
variables θ1t and θ
2
t from the same probability distribution on {S, U}, with respective
probabilities (1 − q, q). The expert sequentially observes two independent signals sit,
with i = 1, 2 that reveal whether θit = U and makes a report to the principal. With
probability 1 − η, the true signal can be concealed. Each expert makes the report on s1t
before observing s2t . There is no within-period discounting. Any time a firm’s activity is
authorized, the firm obtains G and, if the activity is unsafe, there are damages D to third
parties. Only after having collected and reported on the two signals, the expert can give
a positive contribution to the industry. Specifically, he can yield v to the regulated firm
and ū to other firms.
For this amended model, the timing of the stage game is as follows:
0. The principal commits to the authorization decision as a function of the report
xr ∈ {0, 1}.
1. Nature draws the states of the world θit and the concealment costs c
i
t for i = 1, 2.




t ) ≥ 0.
2. If the expert accepts to work for the regulatory agency,
(a) he observes the signal s1t and sends a public report r
1
t to the principal who
authorizes or not production according to xr.
(b) Then, the expert observes the signal s2t and sends a public report r
2
t to the
principal who authorizes or not production according to xr and pays the expert
βt.
3. The firm may make an offer wt to the expert, who can either accept this offer or
take up his outside option.
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Consider the following revolving-door implicit contract with multiple per-period reports,
denoted RD2: (i) experts always conceal evidence when the concealment cost is c = c; (ii)
the firm rewards experts who report r1 = ∅ and/or r2 = ∅ with improved job prospects;
(iii) if at period t+l the firm did not improve the job prospects of the expert who reported
r1 = ∅ and/or r2 = ∅, then at t + l′ with l′ > l, the experts always reveal unfavorable
evidence.
We continue to restrict attention to stationary equilibria. The firm’s offered salary wrr
and the principal’s bonus schedule βrr are both functions of the two reports made by an
expert. To focus this extension on the design of policies that deter regulatory capture, we
now impose the following assumption that will be maintained throughout the subsection.
q
1− q
(1− η)(D + c−G) > v. (9)
The above inequality implies that closing the revolving door following a report that bene-
fits the firm is preferred to tolerating capture from a social standpoint, i.e., (1−q)G+qv >
(1 − qη)G − q(1 − η)(D + c) + v. It requires that the social cost of concealing that the
state is bad, D + c − G, be relatively large as compared to the expert’s contribution to
industry profits, v, and that the probabilities that the state is unsafe and evidence can
be concealed be non-negligible. The above restriction dramatically reduces the number
of cases we have to contemplate as we do not need to worry about the possibility that
the principal may find it advantageous to partially tolerate capture. This is because we
need not consider the possibility that the principal may allow the expert’s concealment
of unfavorable evidence in either stage 2.a or stage 2.b. At the same time, the restriction
does not undermine our goal of more properly designing the revolving-door policy.19 We
leave aside the possibility that the agency may employ distinct experts to collect the two
signals, which is a question that has received considerable attention in the literature (e.g.,
see Laffont and Martimort, 1999).20 We also assume that the expert must send r1t before
the end of stage 2.a, for otherwise an approval does not yield G to the firm, that is, the
first activity must be timely approved to be profitable.
19Furthermore, note that if (9) does not hold, conditionally closing the revolving door is never socially
beneficial and the principal’s choice boils down to either tolerating capture or deterring it with bonuses.
20This restriction can be justified on the grounds that there might be shortages of trained personnel
who can collect valuable information about θ. In the real world, it may be impractical to assign to each
expert only one report to make.
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To prevent capture, the principal could close the revolving door, irrespective of what
reports an expert makes. Such a blanket ban on joining the industry would result in the
following welfare:
WRD2blanketban = 2(1− q)G,
because the firm would not be able to reward an accommodating expert and, as a conse-
quence, capture would not occur. Our first result can straightforwardly be proved.
Remark 4. Unconditionally closing the revolving door is inefficient.
To prove this option, it is sufficient to show that it is dominated by opening the
revolving door conditional on the expert’s sending two unfavorable reports, i.e., r1 = r2 =
U - option we refer to as UU . As an expert can be hired only if he is never accommodating,
then the revolving door cannot give rise to regulatory capture. As the firm will leap at
the chance of hiring a valuable expert if both reports have been unfavorable, welfare is:
WRD2conditionalbanUU = 2(1− q)G+ q2v > WRD2close.
There are other anti-capture policies that the principal could pursue which involve a joint
use of bonuses and selectively-closing the revolving door. Firstly, the principal could
keep the revolving door open if the first report has been unfavorable - we refer to this
alternative as Ur, because the second report does not affect whether the expert can
join the industry. Secondly, the principal could open the revolving door if the second
report has been unfavorable - we label this alternative rU . While both options suffice
to prevent full evidence manipulation, they are vulnerable to partial capture, whereby
the firm promises to reward the expert if the second (respectively, the first) report is
favorable. For this reason, the principal must promise a reward to the expert when the
reports are unfavorable to the firm. The next result compares these two policies from the
principal’s perspective.
Remark 5. The principal always prefers Ur to rU .
To understand why, consider that with policy rU , if partial capture occurred, the
expert would conceal an unfavorable signal in stage 2.a whenever the concealment cost
is low. With policy Ur, if partial capture were to occur, the expert would conceal an
unfavorable signal in stage 2.b whenever the concealment cost is low and the first report
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was unfavorable. As the firm would get a higher expected gross profit with rU than with
Ur by inducing evidence concealment in one period, deterring partial capture is more
expensive for the principal.
The principal could also open the revolving door as long as at least one report has been
unfavorable (that is, irrespective of its order) or fully rely on bonuses to deter capture
for both reports. We henceforth label these options 1U and Bonus2, respectively. We
obtain the following proposition by comparing the welfare expressions and performing
comparative statics on two key parameters, λ and v.
Remark 6. When each expert collects and reports on two signals sequentially, the prin-
cipal will deter capture by choosing a policy P ∈ {UU,Ur, 1U,Bonus2}. Moreover,
(a) an increase in v reduces the appeal of UU and makes 1U relatively better than Ur.
For v sufficiently high, Bonus2 is the unique optimal policy.
(b) An increase in λ reduces the appeal of Bonus2 and makes Ur relatively better than
1U . For λ sufficiently high, UU is the unique optimal policy.
When the value of regulatory expertise v is more significant, closing the revolving door
is less desirable and the principal leans towards the use of bonuses to prevent capture.
Among the policies which involve selectively closing the revolving door, the principal
prefers to use 1U than Ur because the former deters capture while leaving a larger chance
for the expert to join the private sector. When paying the expert is more expensive for the
principal, i.e., λ is higher, selectively closing the revolving door becomes a more attractive
option than using bonuses. If λ is very high relative to v, the principal would optimally
resort to UU , namely, the stricter revolving-door policy. For intermediate values of λ,
the principal may prefer to use Ur rather than 1U , as it involves a lower bonus. Figure
4 in the appendix graphically illustrates the principal’s anti-capture policy as function of
the parameters. It confirms the finding of the baseline model that a higher cost of raising
public funds makes a stricter revolving-door policy more attractive, whereas a larger value
of the regulatory expertise favors the adoption of a bonus policy.
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4.7 Explicit Capture
In this section, we suppose that the firm can attempt to influence the reporting strategy
by using bribes or the promise of a post-agency job. Specifically, the firm can approach the
expert before he sends his report to the principal with a take-it-or-leave-it explicit side-
contract: a bribe b to report r = ∅. The cost of arranging and enforcing the side-contract,
(1− τ)b, is lost, where τ ∈ [0, 1).21
There are two main takeaways.22 First, the firm would either use the bribe or the
revolving door to capture the experts but not both.





increasing in δ, such that for τ above (below) the threshold the firm would only use the
bribe (salary) to capture the expert.
And second, as a direct consequence:
Corollary 1. A better (yet inefficient) bribing technology may prevent the firm from using
the revolving door to capture the experts.
The intuition is that the implicit promise of a post-agency salary is not credible if
the firm will be able to resort to a slightly inefficient third-party enforcement mechanism
in the future that enables explicit capture. Note that when either τ or δ are sufficiently
high, the principal will refrain from preventing capture.
Importantly, policies other than the bonus scheme that can prevent capture, such as
those which affect τ , like whistleblowing protection policies or higher-quality monitoring,
and wMax, like cooling-off periods should be designed bearing in mind how capture is
enforced. The policies seem to be complementary: a substitution between the two means
of capture may take place if the policy maker only changes one policy.
21While we treat this parameter as exogenous, in practice the ease with which the collusive partners
can enforce the explicit side contract depends on institutional and cultural factors, like the scrutiny of
the firm-expert interaction, external monitoring, whistleblowing protection policies, as well as penalties
for the parties that are found guilty.
22Detailed derivations and discussions can be found in Section B.7 of the Appendix.
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The same intuition also provides an important implication for commissions and kick-
backs: policies that promote capping or banning these (as suggested by e.g., Inderst and
Ottaviani, 2012c) may be ineffective if a firm can simply hire or promote the advisors or
salespeople whose recommendation it wants to influence.
If there is frequent interaction between a firm and a regulatory agency, the revolving
door is the favorite (and possibly unique) channel used by the firm to capture experts.
However, a more efficient bribing technology or an authority that does not monitor bribes
leads to bribes being used rather than the revolving door. This scenario appears to best
fit (large parts of) the developing world. Uncertainty about firms’ survival prospects
and scarce resources available to monitoring and implementing regulation (as argued by
Estache and Wren-Lewis, 2009) contribute to making bribes so notoriously rife in less
developed countries. By contrast, in most richer countries, thanks to superior monitoring
and better enforcement of well-established policies, explicit capture is a less pressing issue.
However, as firms typically have a longer life-span, the credibility of their promises to
reward accommodating experts is reinforced, making implicit capture the chief concern.23
In Figure 3, we graphically represent the parameter regions where capture is tolerated
or deterred and which kind of policies the principal uses to deter capture or which channel
the firm uses. Note that we have defined
δ̂ :=
(1− η)(D −G+ c) + λc
q(1− η)η(D −G+ c) + qλ[(1− η)G+ ηc]
,
and it is derived from λ̂, whereas τ̄ is the positive root that we can obtain from λ̃ as
characterized in Lemma 2 in Appendix B.7, i.e., the threshold of λ above which the
principal prefers to tolerate explicit capture rather than prevent it.24
23In this respect, there is a complementarity with the paper by Harstad and Svensson (2011). Harstad
and Svensson (2011) develop a model that can explain why bribery is relatively more prevalent in poor
countries and lobbying is more commonly found in rich ones, whereas our model can account for why
capture is more likely to occur via bribes in poor countries and via the revolving door in rich ones.
24The figure is drawn from the following parameter values: q = 0.5, η = 0.8, c = 0.5, G = 20, D = 30,
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Figure 3: Equilibria and Interplay between τ and δ.
5 Concluding Remarks
In this paper we have studied how firms can use the revolving-door channel to capture
experts. So far, the informative role played by the revolving door has been overlooked. We
have shown that this channel is more efficient than bribes to sway regulatory outcomes:
recruiting former regulators can be a very powerful commitment device, signaling to
current and future experts the firm’s eagerness to reward a lenient behavior. It is also
more efficient than bribes in that the revolving door can emerge as an industry norm
that does not require an explicit and illegal agreement between the firm-experts coalition.
However, the more efficient the explicit side-contract, the less likely it is that the firm can
use superior implicit agreements.
We have highlighted that the desirability of keeping the revolving door open depends
on the frequency of the firm-regulatory agency interaction. When this is sporadic, the
revolving door should better be open. As capture would require an explicit agreement,
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standard anti-corruption policies, such as whistleblowing protection, could be used to de-
ter collusion. If interaction is frequent, an implicit understanding between regulators and
the regulated firm can sustain capture via the revolving door. The lack of smoking-gun
evidence means that regulatory capture could be deterred either by generously rewarding
experts who report information that is unfavorable to the firm or by closing the revolving
door. The pros and cons of closing the revolving door should be weighed against each
other. If the regulatory experts’ contribution to the industry or their opportunity cost
of working for the agency is high, it may be socially beneficial to tolerate capture. This
is especially the case if the likelihood that the experts can actually misreport informa-
tion is low. In this regard, we have shown that opening the door selectively, namely,
conditionally on the information revealed by the experts can be welfare improving. It is
straightforward but noteworthy that regulatory capture may also lead to a misallocation
of human resources if the capturing firm hires experts who would be better placed in other
firms or institutions. This would make capture deterrence even more valuable.
One might argue that firms may hire experts to get a more direct and efficient access
to their (then former) colleagues (e.g., see Blanes i Vidal et al., 2012). According to this
view, a policy preventing former experts from interacting with their previous colleagues,
or working on cases directly related to their previous job, would make the firm less likely to
hire experts, whereas in our model, this policy should not have any effect. If direct access
to experts is problematic, such a policy could be complementary to selectively closing the
revolving door. As employment restrictions reducing access are already in place in some
agencies, it would be possible to test the relative importance of either channel empirically
(signaling/monitoring versus access).
Another important question that we leave open for future research is how competition
among firms affects the optimal policies to deal with regulatory capture. A firm might
have an incentive to induce experts to truthfully report unfavorable evidence about other
firms to shut them down. At the same time, the firms’ incentives to collude with one
another change, which in turn may make regulatory capture harder to deter. Thus,
the effects of competition on regulatory capture are unclear and may depend on several
institutional factors. However, we expect the mechanisms of our model to continue to
play a role. As we implicitly model a competitive fringe via the expert’s outside option
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u, we conjecture that our results continue to hold at least in settings where the expertise
an expert acquires at the regulatory agency is very firm-specific or the products firms sell
are very differentiated.
In the model, we have assumed that the experts’ reports are used to determine whether
the firm can be authorized to produce. While this best fits the case of experts charged
with assessing a firm’s eligibility for patents or licenses, the framework can be adapted to
analyze other contexts where regulatory capture is a concern, from public procurement to
tax auditing, from financial supervision to firms’ compliance with existing laws. Third-
party certification is another suitable setting to which the findings of our model can be
applied, as certifiers may distort information to benefit or harm sellers (e.g., see Dranove
and Jin, 2010 and references therein). Our framework could even be reinterpreted to
analyze the transition of politicians to the private sector - in this case, the citizenry
would be the principal and the politicians would be the experts. Lastly, we believe that
our findings also speak to the current debate about the anonymity of referee reports:
allowing or requiring referees to disclose their identity may enable referees to publicly
signal their willingness to engage in and stick to a mutually beneficial exchange of favors,
which may increase biases in the refereeing process.
A Appendix A
Proof of Proposition 1
In the first-best solution, the principal sets βU = β∅ = 0. Suppose first that the principal
does not alter the bonus policy. The maximum salary that the firm can credibly promise
to pay, wMax∅ is derived from making (1) bind. This must be at least as large as c to induce
low-concealment cost experts to hide evidence. Therefore, if δ < δ̃ there is no room for
capture - part (a) of the proposition.
To show part (b) of the proposition, suppose now that δ ≥ δ̃ so that capture may
occur. If the principal decides to tolerate capture, it is better not to reward experts
because λ > 0. It follows that the firm will offer the minimum wage that induces capture,
i.e., w = c and WRDtolerate is obtained. Alternatively, the principal will prevent capture by
setting ∆β = βU −β∅ > wMax∅ −c. To minimize the cost of capture deterrence, β∅ = 0 and
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WRdbonus is obtained. The principal prefers to deter capture whenWRDbonus ≥ WRDtolerate,




−q(1− η)2G(D −G+ c)
[δq(1− η)G− (1− δqη)c]2
< 0.
Proof of Proposition 2
It directly follows from comparing welfare expressions.
Proof of Proposition 3
For a bribery implicit contract that induces experts to conceal evidence to be self-enforcing
it must be that the following expert’s capture incentive compatibility holds, that is, a low
concealment cost expert must prefer to manipulate evidence that the state is unsafe:
µbb ≥ βU − β∅ + c,
where µb is the expert’s belief that the firm will make good on the promise. The firm’s
capture-incentive compatibility constraint requires that:
−(1− δ)b+ δ 1− δ
1− δµb
[µbπ




RD + (1− µb)πSG].
Paying the bribe does not affect future experts’ belief that the firm makes good on the
promises. Therefore, the only credible bribe is b = 0, but this cannot induce experts to
manipulate evidence if ∆β ≥ 0 and c ≥ 0, with at least one strict inequality.
Proof of Remark 1
Suppose that at the end of each period, the period t expert can send a message mt ∈
{C,NC} that is observed by all future experts. An expert sends message C if the firm has
paid the implicitly agreed-upon bribe and NC, otherwise. A low-concealment cost expert
who has observed s = U conceals information only if C has been reported by all previous
experts. Then, it is possible to construct an equilibrium where capture is self-enforcing
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if δ is high enough. Suppose that ∆β = 0 and b = c ≥ 0, if r = ∅, and no bribe is paid
otherwise. Then, if
δ(πRD − πSG) ≥(1− δ)c
⇔ G ≥ 1− δqη
δq(1− η)
c,
then neither the firm nor the experts are willing to deviate. If a deviation has occurred,
the experts will not conceal evidence anymore: they earn the same irrespective of what
they do and can force the firm to its min-max payoff.
Proof of Stationarity
First note that the firm cannot influence experts with c = ∞. Now consider a situation
in which the firm manages to let the low manipulation cost expert misreport the signal
in period t in the derived stationary equilibrium. Because the expert does not care about
any future periods and is just indifferent between misreporting or not in t, there is no
cheaper way for the firm to influence this expert. Moreover, the firm could not benefit
from a different report and, because we look at an equilibrium, the cost for the firm does
not exceed its benefit from misreporting. Now consider a situation in which the firm does
not want to let the low manipulation cost expert misreport the signal in period t in the
derived stationary equilibrium. Trivially, the equilibrium wage is the cheapest wage the
firm can offer. If the firm wanted to influence the experts, the cheapest way would be
using the wage w as in the analysis for the stationary equilibrium because the expert
does not care about any future periods and would just be indifferent. However, by the
optimality of the equilibrium, the cost for the firm exceeds its benefit from misreporting.
Thus, there is no situation in which the firm could do better.
B Appendix B
B.1 Proof of Remark 2
The according conditions are unchanged.
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B.2 Proof of Proposition 4
The principal again has four different options.
Tolerating capture. In this case, the principal does not offer a bonus and welfare
is:
WRDtolerateUEffort = G− qD + v.
Note that the principal does not induce effort and thus no expert acquires information.
If the principal wanted to provide enough incentives without closing the revolving door
at least selectively, this would be equivalent to the reward scheme case below (in which
there is no capture).
Reward scheme. The principal may decide to prevent capture by setting a reward











which may be more expensive than if high-ability experts detect the unsafe state auto-
matically. Welfare is:
WRDdeterUEffort = (1− q)G+ v − λqβRDdeterUEffort − ce.
Blanket ban. A blanket ban only makes sense if the principal also induces effort.
This solution gives:
WRDblanketbanUEffort = (1− q)G− λqβRDblanketbanUEffort − ce,where
βRDblanketban∅Effort = 0 and β
RDblanketban
UEffort = ce/q.
Conditional ban. Also a conditional ban only makes sense if effort induced.
WRDconditionalbanUEffort = (1− q)G+ qv − λqβRDconditionalbanUEffort − ce,
which is strictly higher thanWRDblanketbanUEffort , where β
RDconditionalban
∅Effort = 0 and β
RDconditionalban
UEffort =
max{ce/q− ū, 0}. The principal does not have to pay such a high bonus if the inspector is
also motivated by future wages. The principal prefers to (selectively) keep the revolving
door open if:
(1− q)v > λq(βUEffortURDdeter − βRDconditionalbanUEffort ).
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If ce is small, this is the same condition as in the case in which the high-ability expert
automatically learns the unsafe state.
The statement of the proposition directly follows from comparing welfare expressions.
B.3 Moral Hazard on safety care
We assume that, in each period t, the firm privately decides whether or not to dedicate
resources to improve product safety. If the firm does not invest, the good is unsafe with
baseline probability q0, whereas if the firm invests at cost φ > 0, the probability that the
activity is unsafe reduces to q1 < q0.
25 It holds that 1 > 1 − q1 > 1 − q0 > 0 and we set
G > q0D. Hence, investing does not rule out the possibility that the good brings about
damages and, if there were no information about the state of the world, the principal










so that the firm would invest in the stage game, whereas it would not in the repeated
game if it succeeded in capturing the experts.26 Thus, capture is associated with the twin
evils of excessive authorization and under-investment in safety. The firm’s expected profit
if capture takes place is
πRDqEnd = (1− q0η)(G− w∅)− q0ηwU + v,
and the maximum self-enforcing salary is derived from making the firm’s dynamic capture-
incentive compatibility constraint bind:
wMax∅ = ū+
δ[(q1 − q0η)G+ φ]
1− δq0η
,
since wU will continue to be set equal to ū. For capture to be an issue, it must be that
δ > δ̃qEnd, where
δ̃qEnd :=
c
(q1 − q0η)G+ φ+ q0ηc
.
25For simplicity, we assume that the firm’s investment decision is binary. Having a continuous invest-
ment function would not qualitatively alter the main conclusions of the analysis.
26In fact, the condition is overly restrictive: since the firm needs to pay a premium to an expert who
reports ∅, the right-bound of the interval can be higher.
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When it is an issue, tolerating capture would yield:
WRDtolerateqEnd = (1− q0η)G− q0(1− η)(D + c) + v.
To prevent capture, the principal will contemplate two options. First, paying a bonus
to an expert who reports r = ∅. Specifically, setting βRDbonusU = 0 and βRDbonus∅ =
δ[(q1−q0η)G+φ]
1−δq0η − c both deters capture and restores optimal investment incentives. Welfare
is
WRDbonusqEnd = (1− q1)G− λq1
(




+ v − φ.
Note that an increase in the investment cost makes resorting to the bonus policy less
convenient, whereas the effect of an increase in the investment gain, q0−q1, unequivocally
increases welfare under this solution.
The principal could also prevent capture by prohibiting experts who have made fa-
vorable reports from joining the industry at the end of their term at the agency. By
adopting this policy, the principal need not use positive bonuses to reward the expert,




+ (v − ū).
Welfare is
WRDconditionalbanqEnd =
(1− q1)G+ q1v − φ, if v − ū < G−
φ
(q0−q1) ;
(1− q0)G+ q0v, otherwise.
Comparing welfare expressions: preventing capture with a bonus scheme is preferred to
tolerating capture if
λ ≤ λ̂qEnd ≡
(1− δq0η)[q0(1− η)(D + c)− (q1 − q0η)G+ φ]]
q1δ[(q1 − q0η)G+ φ]− q1(1− δq0η)c
.
When v − ū is below the threshold, selectively closing the revolving door is preferred to
the bonus policy if
v < v̂qEnd1 ≡ λ
q1
1− q1
δ[(q1 − q0η)G+ φ]− (1− q0δη)c
(1− q0δη)
.
The conditional ban dominates tolerating capture for:
v ≤ ṽqEnd1 ≡




which coincides with the previous threshold for λ = λ̂qEnd.
If v − ū is high enough so that the conditional ban would lead to a low investment,
the conditional ban outperforms tolerating capture if
v < ṽqEnd0 ≡
q0
1− q0
(1− η)(D + c−G).
Moreover, it outperforms the bonus policy if:








− (q0 − q1)G− φ
1− q0
.
Note that for λ = λ̂qEnd, the two thresholds v̂qEnd0 and ṽqEnd0 coincide. We summarize
the results of this extension in the following proposition.
Proposition 6. Suppose that δ ≥ δ̃qEnd and v − ū > ( resp. ≤)G− φ(q0−q1) .
1. If λ ≤ λ̂qEnd, the principal prevents regulatory capture by
(a) selectively closing the revolving door if v < v̂qEnd0 (resp., v < v̂qEnd1);
(b) using the bonus policy if v ≥ v̂qEnd0 (resp., v ≥ v̂qEnd1).
2. If λ > λ̂qEnd, the principal
(a) prevents capture by selectively closing the revolving door if v ≤ ṽqEnd0 (resp.,
v < ṽqEnd1);
(b) tolerates capture if v > ṽqEnd0 (resp., v > ṽqEnd1).
B.4 Experts versus Bureaucrats - technical details
Obviously, in the stage game, there is no welfare gain from hiring bureaucrats. To see
this, note that welfare would drop to W SGB = (1 − qε)G − q(1 − ε)D + vB, where we use
the subscript B to refer to the employment of bureaucrats, rather than experts. In the
repeated game, the emergence of capture may provide a rationale for hiring bureaucrats.
We characterize the principal’s favorite policy when all officials are bureaucrats.
Proposition 7. Capture is an issue only for δ > δ̃B and
1. If λ ≤ λ̂B, the principal prevents regulatory capture by
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(a) selectively closing the revolving door if vB < v̂B;
(b) using the bonus policy if vB ≥ v̂B.
2. If λ > λ̂B, the principal
(a) prevents capture by selectively closing the revolving door if vB ≤ ṽB;
(b) tolerates capture if vB > ṽB.
Proof. Suppose that only bureaucrats are available. The firm’s capture-incentive dynamic
constraint is:
(1− δ)(vB − wB∅ ) + δπRDB ≥ (1− δ)(vB − ūB) + δπSGB ,
where
πRDB = (1− qεη)(G− wB∅ )− qεηwBU + vB,
and πSGB = (1−qε)G+vB− ūB. It follows that the maximum self-enforcing salary wB−Max∅
that the firm could credibly promise to pay is:




The salary must also be such that the bureaucrat is willing to conceal unfavorable evi-
dence:
wB∅ − c̄+ βB∅ > wBU
With bureaucrats, capture is an issue for δ > δ̃B :=
c
qε(1−η)G+qεηc . When an issue, the
principal can tolerate capture getting
WRDtolerateB = (1− qεη)G− q(1− εη)D − qε(1− η)c+ vB.
The principal could decide to deter capture by using the bonus policy or by conditionally
banning bureaucrats that have provided favorable information from taking up a position
in the industry. In the latter case, welfare would be:
WRDconditionalbanB = (1− qε)G+ qεvB − q(1− ε)D.




1−δqεη − c prevents capture and
yields:








By comparing welfare expressions, it is easy to check that the bonus policy is preferred
to tolerating capture when
λ ≤ λ̂B :=
(1− η)(1− δqεη)(D −G+ c)
δqε(1− η)G− (1− δqεη)c
.
Moreover, WRDconditionalbanB > W
RDbonus
B for:









and WRDconditionalbanB ≥ WRDtolerateB for:
v ≤ ṽB :=
qε
1− qε
(1− η)(D −G+ c).
It also easy to see that ṽB = λ̂B v̂B.
We now determine when the principal may benefit from hiring bureaucrats rather than
experts.
Remark 7. The principal may prefer to hire bureaucrats to either (i) avoid capture being
an issue or (ii) reduce the cost of the bonus policy.
Proof. (i) For δ ∈ (δ̃, δ̃B], capture is an issue only if the principal employs experts to
monitor the firm. See that: W SGB > W
RDtolerate if q(ε− η)(D−G) > (v− vB)− q(1− η)c;
W SGB > W







> q(1− ε)(D −G) + (v − vB).
All inequalities are more likely to hold when ε is higher and vB is closer to v, that is the
inefficiency of the bureaucrats is not excessive.
(ii) See that WRDbonusB is not necessarily increasing in ε, because it may increase the
total bonus bill. Let εRDbonus be the level of ε ∈ [0, 1] that maximizes WRDbonusB . Note



















> 0, whereas ∂ε
RDbonus
∂λ
< 0 if G is relatively higher than c. As
εRDbonus may be less than one, the principal may prefer to hire bureaucrats instead of
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experts. It is also straightforward to see that WRDconditionalbanB < W
RDconditionalban.
Lastly, note that
WRDtolerate ≥ WRDtolerateB ⇔ D −G ≥
(1− η)
η
c− v − vB
qη(1− ε)
.
Note that D −G < (1−η)
η
c would imply that
∂WRDtolerateB
∂ε
< 0, so that the principal would
be better off by hiring clueless officials, that is, by shutting down the agency.
B.5 Cooling-off periods
Post-employment restrictions. Title 18 of the U.S. Code in Section 207 establishes
general post-employment restrictions on former officers, employees, and elected officials
of the executive agencies of the United States. These include (i) a permanent ban on
influencing any agency’s or court’s decision in connection with a particular matter in
which the person participated personally; (ii) a two-year ban concerning those matters
that were pending under the person’s responsibility up to year after leaving office; (iii) a
one-year ban on senior officials to influence the department or agency in which the person
worked for any matters for which the person seeks official action. Procurement officers
are subject to further restrictions: they cannot accept compensation from the contractor
of a procurement of $10, 000, 000 or more within one year of working on the procurement.
There may also be different restrictions for specific regulators. For instance, Tenekedjieva
(2019) documents quite some variation in the legal restrictions U.S. State commissioners
(some of whom are appointed by the State governors) face when they leave office, such as
temporary ban on lobbying or on assisting formerly regulated firms.
In the European Union (EU), the legislation is essentially decentralized to the single
state members. This has resulted in a great deal of heterogeneity, as emphasized by a
Transparency International report that focuses on lobbying (Mulcahy, 2015). The report
assesses the regulation of the lobbying practice in the EU. Among the metrics taken into
account, there is integrity, namely, the rules that govern the ethical conduct of lobbyists
and public officials. The results are rather grim. First, lobbyists and public officials are
not subject to clear and enforceable rules regarding their activity: some countries do not
even have a code of conduct for public sector employees. Many countries have adopted
cooling-off periods for some public officials. For instance, in France, the law requires a
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three-year cooling-off period before a public official could join a firm that he or she was
previously responsible for in terms of surveillance or control activities. Only legislators in
many states in the US are subject to cooling-off periods, whereas in Europe only Slovenia
has rolled out a cooling-off period for MPs. Lastly, the report also finds that the provisions
are generally poorly enforced.
Proof of Remark 3














B.5.1 Proof of Proposition 5
We start by determining welfare under unconditional cooling-off periods. We need to find
the maximum salary the firm would be willing to pay to an expert who is accommodating.
If there is regulatory capture:

















The maximum salary the firm would be willing to pay is
wMax∅ = ū+
(1 + γ)δq(1− η)G
1− δqη + γ(1− δ)
.







βRDdeterU (γ) = max
{
δq(1− η)G




We now determine welfare under report-contingent cooling-off periods. To distinguish
this solution, in the rest of the proof, we use the subscript select. Profit under regulatory
capture is:






+ qη(v − ū).
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If regulatory capture cannot be sustained:
πSGselect = (1− q)G+
(1− q)(v − ū)
1 + γ
+ q(v − ū).
Therefore,
πRDselect − πSGselect = q(1− η)G−
(1− qη)(w∅ + γv)
1 + γ
+
[1 + qγ − qη(1 + γ)]ū
1 + γ
.
The maximum salary the firm would be willing to pay is
wMax∅ =
(1 + γ)δq(1− η)G− δqγ(1− η)v − [δγ(1− q)− (1− δqη)(1 + γ)]ū]
δ(1− qη) + (1 + γ)(1− δ)
.






− ū− c, 0
}
.












The second term is negative, reflecting how a longer cooling-off period blunts the influence
of future industry payments on the expert’s report. The expert discounts the lure of
receiving a higher salary from the regulated firm compared to what he could receive from
other employers in the industry. However, a longer cooling-off period tends to increase




qδ(1− η)[δ(1− qη)G− (1− δqη)(v − ū)]
[1 + γ(1− δ)− qδη]2
.
This is because the longer cooling-off period actually increases the gap between the con-
tinuation payoffs, πRDselect and π
SG
select, by deferring the payment of the salary to the accom-
modating expert. As a result, a longer cooling-off period can make the firm more willing
to keep its promises. As the overall effect tends to be negative, the principal may want
to opt for a positive γ.












γδ(1− η)v + γ[1− qδ + γ(1− δ)]ū
(1 + γ)[1 + γ(1− δ)− qδη]
)
.
27We make the comparison for positive bonuses, for otherwise it is not optimal to set a positive cooling-
off period, regardless of its conditionality on the report.
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Thus, in what follows we restrict attention to report-contingent cooling-off periods. If
βRDSelectU > 0, consider the first order condition of the principal’s problem for an interior
optimum:





The second order condition is negative for λ sufficiently high. We now use the implicit
function theorem to study how changes in the primitives affect γ at the interior optimum.
As the second-order condition must be satisfied, the sign of ∂γ
U
∂λ










as βU must be decreasing in γ at the interior solution. Consider now the impact of an
























(1 + γ)[1 + γ(1− δ)− qδη]2
− qδ(1 + γ)(1− η)
(1 + γ)2[1 + γ(1− δ)− qδη]
=− qδ(1− δ)(1− η)
[1 + γ(1− δ)− qδη]2
< 0.




















− qδ(1− η)(1− qδη)
(1 + γ)[1 + γ(1− δ)− qδη]2
+
qδγ(1− η)





qδ(1− η)[1− γ2(1− δ)− qδη]
(1 + γ)2[1 + γ(1− δ)− qδη]2
.
It can also be shown that an increase in ū has an ambiguous effect on the equilibrium
bonus and, consequently, on the equilibrium value of γ.
B.6 Multiple per-period reports
Consider the firm’s payoff in the stage game, where there is no capture: πSG2 = 2(1 −
q)G + v − ū and social welfare is W FB2 = 2(1 − q)G + v, where we have added 2 to the
superscript denoting the solution, as there are two signals.
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The tightest firm’s dynamic capture-incentive compatibility constraint occurs when
an expert has reported r1 = r2 = ∅, since it plausibly holds that w∅∅ ≥ max{w∅U , wU∅} ≥
min{w∅U , wU∅} ≥ wUU :
(1− δ)(v − w∅∅) + δπRD2 ≥ (1− δ)(v − ū) + δπSG2, (B1)
where πRD2 denotes the firm’s expected profit from adhering to the revolving-door implicit
contract is:
πRD2 = 2(1− qη)G− (1− qη)2w∅∅ − (1− qη)qη(w∅U + wU∅)− q2η2wUU + v.
Therefore,
∆π2 := π
RD2−πSG2 = 2q(1− η)G− (1− qη)2w∅∅− (1− qη)qη(w∅U +wU∅)− q2η2wUU + ū.
Consider now the expert’s capture incentive compatibility constraints. The expert must
be willing to conceal an unfavorable signal whenever the cost of concealment is low. Thus,
irrespective of his first report, the expert must be willing to incur c to conceal unfavorable
evidence in Stage 3
wr∅ − c+ βr∅ > wrU + βrU ,
for r ∈ {U, ∅}. That is,
w∅∅ − c+ β∅∅ > w∅U + β∅U (B2)
when r1 = ∅, and
wU∅ − c+ βU∅ > wUU + βUU (B3)
when r1 = U . The expert must also be willing to conceal evidence for his first report,
without knowing with certainty the second signal he will collect as well as its manipula-
bility:
(1− qη)(w∅∅ + β∅∅) + qη(w∅U + β∅U)− c > (1− qη)(wU∅ + βU∅) + qη(wUU + βUU). (B4)
Let us first determine when regulatory capture is an issue that inevitably decreases welfare.
Namely, suppose that the revolving door is open and the principal does not offer a positive
bonus. The firm would set the minimum salaries that satisfy (B2), (B3), and (B4). It
is immediate to see that the salary schedule which make all these constraints bind is:
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w∅∅ = 2c + ū, wU∅ = w∅U = c + ū, wUU = ū.
28 Replacing these wages in (B1), we find
that deterring capture is costless if δ ≤ δ̃.
If δ > δ̃, but the principal does not take any measure to prevent regulatory capture,
welfare is:
WRD2tolerate = 2(1− qη)G− 2q(1− η)(D + c) + v.
Because of Inequality (9), this is always dominated by some other options. We now show
that Ur dominates rU .
Proof of Remark 5
Consider first option Ur. For partial capture to be an equilibrium, it must be that the
expert is willing to conceal unfavorable evidence in stage 2.b:
wU∅ + βU∅ − c > wUU + βUU ,
and that the firm is willing to honor the promise of paying a higher salary to an expert
whose second report has been favorable:
(1− δ)(v − wU∅) + δπRD2Ur ≥ (1− δ)(v − ū) + δπSG2Ur .
Bear in mind that with this revolving-door policy, if there is no capture the firm obtains
πSG2Ur = 2(1− q)G+ q(v− ū), because the expert can be hired only if r1 = U , which occurs
with probability q. If the firm succeeds in partially capturing the experts, it expects to
get:
πRD2Ur = (1− q)G+ q(1− qη)G+ (1− q)2G− q(1− qη)wU∅ − q2ηwUU + qv.
Therefore, the highest salary the firm would be willing to pay is:
wMaxU∅ = ū+
δq2(1− η)G
1− δ + δq(1− qη)
.
Partial capture is an issue only if δ > c
q2(1−η)G+[1−q(1−qη)]c . In that case, to prevent capture
in Stage 3 through the bonus policy, it is easy to see that the principal should set βUU =
δq2(1−η)G
1−δ+δq(1−qη) − c and all the other bonuses equal to 0. Welfare would be:
WRD2bonusUr = 2(1− q)G− λq2
[
δq2(1− η)G




28In fact, to induce capture the firm will have to pay the expert slightly more than those salaries.
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With rU , for partial capture to be an equilibrium, it must be that the expert is willing
to conceal unfavorable evidence in stage 2.a, knowing that there will never be concealment
in stage 2.b:
q(w∅U + β∅U) + (1− q)β∅∅ − c > q(wUU + βUU) + (1− q)βU∅.
Moreover, the firm must find it profitable to make good on the promised salary if r1 = ∅
and r2 = U :
(1− δ)(v − w∅U) + δπRD2rU ≥ (1− δ)(v − ū) + δπSG2rU .
Note that, with this revolving-door policy, if there is no capture the firm obtains πSG2rU =
2(1− q)G+ q(v − ū). If partial capture occurs, the firm expects to obtain:
πRD2rU = (1− qη)G+ (1− q)G− (1− qη)qw∅U − q2ηwUU + qv.
Therefore, the highest salary the firm would be willing to pay is:
wMax∅U = ū+
δq(1− η)G
1− δ + δq(1− qη)
,
which is higher than wMaxU∅ . We retrieve exactly the same threshold as with the other
policy δ > c
q2(1−η)G+[1−q(1−qη)]c . If the above inequality holds and the principal prevents




WRD2bonusrU = 2(1− q)G− λq
[
δq2(1− η)G




The expected wage bill is always higher than with Ur. Therefore, the principal would
never adopt rU because it makes partial-capture prevention more expensive.
We now illustrate the two remaining options.
Option 1U . Firstly, consider that the firm cannot fully capture an expert, since he
cannot be rewarded if r1 = r2 = U . Partial capture could be an equilibrium, though. The
following constraints need to be satisfied if the firm wants to influence the expert as often
as possible: first, the expert must be willing to conceal unfavorable evidence in stage 2.b,
if r1 = U :
wU∅ + βU∅ − c > wUU + βUU ;
29The principal can also pay any combination of βUU and βU∅ such that qβUU + (1 − q)βU∅ =
δq2(1−η)G
1−δ+δq(1−qη) − c to prevent partial capture with the same welfare effects.
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and the expert must be willing to conceal unfavorable evidence in stage 2.a:
q(w∅U + β∅U) + (1− q)β∅∅ − c > (1− qη)(wU∅ + βU∅ − c) + qη(wUU + βUU).
The firm must be willing to honor the promise of paying a higher salary to an expert
whose report has been favorable:
(1− δ)(v − wU∅) + δπRD21U ≥ (1− δ)(v − ū) + δπSG21U
and
(1− δ)(v − w∅U) + δπRD21U ≥ (1− δ)(v − ū) + δπSG21U .
Note that
πSG21U = 2(1− q)G+ q(2− q)(v − ū)
and
πRD21U = (1−qη)G+(1−qη)(1−q)G+qη(1−qη)G−(1−qη)qw∅U−q2η2wUU−qη(1−qη)wU∅+q[1+η(1−q)]v.
We can now compute the surplus that partial capture may bring about:
πRD1U −πSG1U = q(1−η)(1+qη)G−(1−qη)qw∅U−qη(1−qη)wU∅−q(1−q)(1−η)v+q[2−q(1+η2)]ū.
To determine when capture is an issue, set βrr = 0 for any r
1, r2. Note that wU∅ = ū+ c
to induce evidence concealment in stage 2.b. Then, to conceal evidence in stage 2.a,
w∅U ≥ ū+cq . Replacing wU∅ = ū+ c in the second dynamic-enforcement constraint, we can
recover wMax∅U and we find that corruption is an issue only if
δ >
c+ (1− q)ū
q2(1− η)(1 + qη)G+ (1− q + q3η2)c− q2(1− q)(1− η)v + (1− q)[1− (1− q)q]ū
.
It is possible to show that, plugging wU∅ = ū + c and w∅U =
ū+c
q
in the first dynamic-
enforcement constraint, this holds for a lower level of δ.
Moreover, policy 1U opens up further capture opportunities for the firm. First, the
firm may decide to promise a reward only conditional on a favorable report in stage 2.b,
thereby relinquishing to induce concealment of an unfavorable signal in stage 2.a. In that
case, to convince the expert to conceal evidence:
wU∅ + βU∅ − c > wUU + βUU .
53
While this looks like an option we studied earlier, the firm has a strengthened incentive
to keep its promise because the revolving-door policy is more advantageous:
πRD2only21U = (1−q)G+q(1−qη)G+(1−q)
2G−q(1−qη)wU∅−(1−q)qw∅U−q2ηwUU+[1−(1−q)2]v.
Alternatively, the firm may promise to reward an expert for a favorable report in stage 2.
If so,
q(w∅U + β∅U) + (1− q)β∅∅ − c > q(wUU + βUU) + (1− q)(wU∅ + βU∅).
By capturing the expert for the first report,
πRD2only11U = (1−qη)G+(1−q)G−(1−qη)qw∅U−q
2ηwUU−qη(1−q)wU∅+[1−(1−qη)(1−q)]v.
Let us now determine the bonus policy to prevent capture under 1U . It is beneficial
to set β∅∅ = 0. Note that with this revolving-door policy, the principal incentivizes one
unfavorable report sufficiently. Therefore, she optimally only sets a positive βUU and sets
all other bonuses equal to zero. In particular, the principal does not gain from setting
β∅U > 0: as the expert can join the firm only if at least one report is unfavorable, he will
never conceal evidence in stage 2.b, if r1 = ∅. Setting βU∅ > 0 helps prevent concealment
in stage 2.a but makes stage-2.b concealment more attractive. Thus, the principal should
set β∅∅ = β∅U = βU∅ = 0 and βUU > 0. In particular, βUU must be so high that the firm






, wMaxU∅ − c− ū
}
.
We now determine these maximum salaries the firm could promise to pay. The maximum
wU∅ is determined from the firm’s dynamic capture-incentive compatibility constraint
when capture is induced in stage 2.b only:
−(1− δ)(wU∅ − ū) + δ(πRD2only21U − π
SG2





2(1− η)G− q(1− qη)(wU∅ − ū),
the maximum salary that satisfies the constraint is:
wMaxU∅ = ū+
δq2(1− η)G
1− δ + δq(1− qη)
,
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and, as a result, to prevent capture in stage 3:
βUU ≥
δq2(1− η)G
1− δ + δq(1− qη)
− c.
The maximum w∅U is determined from the firm’s dynamic capture-incentive compatibility
constraint when capture is induced in stage 2.a only:
−(1− δ)(w∅U − ū) + δ(πRD2only11U − π
SG2




1U = q(1− η)G− (1− qη)qw∅U − q(1− q)(1− η)v + q(2− q − η)ū,
the maximum salary that satisfies the constraint is:
wMax∅U =
δq(1− η)[G− (1− q)v]
1− δ + δq(1− qη)
+
1− δ + δq(2− q − η)
1− δ + δq(1− qη)
ū.
To prevent capture in stage 2.a:




Preventing capture in stage 2.a is more costly and, accordingly, the bonus must be set to
avert that type of capture when G is sufficiently large as compared to ū, v and c. However,
for our scope, it is convenient to find a threshold expressed in terms of v, where a higher
value of regulatory expertise only decreases the cost of preventing evidence concealment
in stage 2.a whereas it does not affect the cost of deterring concealment in stage 2.b.
Intuitively, by inducing evidence concealment in stage 2.a, the firm may not be able to
hire the expert after all - this occurs if stage 2.b signal turns out to be . Thus, this option
is less appealing to the firm when the value of regulatory expertise is higher. Specifically,
define
ṽ(G, c, ū) ≡ δ
2q(1− η)G+ [1− δ + δq(1− qη)]c− [1− δ + (1− q)δq]ū
q2δ(1− η)
.









if v ≤ ṽ(G, c, ū)
δq2(1−η)G
1−δ+δq(1−qη) − c if v > ṽ(G, c, ū).
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By preventing capture, the principal obtains:
WRD2Bonus1U = 2(1− q)G− λq2β1UBonusUU + [1− (1− q)2]v.
It is immediate to see that WRD2Bonus1U is greater than W
RD2Bonus
Ur if v > ṽ(G, c, ū). In-
tuitively, the same bonus is needed to avert regulatory capture, whereas the benefit of
revolving door, i.e., the valuable contribution of the expert to firm’s profits is enjoyed
more often when the revolving door policy does not establish beforehand in which period
the expert’s report must be unfavorable. If v ≤ ṽ(G, c, ū) a trade-off arises in that policy
1U entails a higher bonus. For this reason, 1U is preferred only if λ is sufficiently low. In
particular, when v ≤ ṽ(G, c, ū), 1U is preferred to Ur if and only if:
λ <
[1− δ + δq(1− qη)]v
δq2(1− η)(G− v)− [1− δ + δq(1− qη)]c− [1− δ + δq(1− q)]ū
.
Option Bonus2. Lastly, suppose that the revolving door is open and the principal fully
relies on bonuses to deter capture for both decisions. If so, the principal would choose
the bonus schedule to maximize
2(1− q)G− λ[(1− q)2β∅∅ + q(1− q)(βU∅ + β∅U) + q2βUU ] + v,
subject to the following constraints:
(1− q)(wU∅ + βU∅) + q(wUU + βUU) ≥ (1− q)(w∅∅ + β∅∅) + q(w∅U + β∅U)− c, (B5)
so that the expert will not find it advantageous to conceal unfavorable evidence in stage
2.a;
w∅U + β∅U ≥ w∅∅ + β∅∅ − c (B6)
so that the expert will not find it advantageous to conceal unfavorable evidence in stage
2.b, if r1 = ∅ and
wUU + βUU ≥ wU∅ + βU∅ − c, (B7)
that ensure that an expert is unwilling to conceal unfavorable evidence in stage 2.b, if
r1 = U . It is immediate to see that β∅∅ = 0. Now, we need to determine the other salaries.
From (B6),
β∅U ≥ w∅∅ − w∅U − c.
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To determine β∅U , we need to find the most tempting salary schedule the firm could
credibly promise to offer to the expert if it wants to induce concealment of unfavorable
evidence in stage 2.b, following r1 = ∅. This is because the other constraints take care
of deterring other capture opportunities. As πSG2 = 2(1 − q)G + v − ū and the profit
associated with this type of capture is
πRD2∅∅only2 = (1− q)G+ (1− q)(1− qη)G+ q(1− q)G+ v − ū− (1− q)(1− qη)(w∅∅ − ū),









1− δ + δ(1− q)(1− qη)
− c.
To determine βUU and βU∅ we first need to determine the most tempting salary schedule
the firm could credibly promise to offer to the expert if it wants to induce concealment of
unfavorable evidence in stage 2.b, following r1 = U , and then if the firm wants to induce
concealment of unfavorable evidence in stage 2.a. The profit associated with capture
occurring only in stage 2.b if r1 = U is:
πRD2∅only2 = (1− q)G+ q(1− qη)G+ (1− q)2G+ v − ū− q(1− qη)(wU∅ − ū).
The profit gain is simply q2(1− η)G− q(1− qη)(wU∅ − ū) and, as a result,
wMaxU∅ =
δq2(1− η)G
1− δ + δq(1− qη)
+ ū.
Consider now the profit associated with capture occurring in stage 2 only:
πRD2Uonly1 = (1− qη)G+ (1− q)G+ v − (1− qη)w∅r − qηū,
and the profit gain is: q(1− η)G− (1− qη)(w∅r− ū). The maximum salary the firm could
credibly promise to offer to induce concealment of the first report is:
wMax∅r =
δq(1− η)G
1− δ + δ(1− qη)
+ ū.
To determine βU∅ and βUU the following system of inequalities must be satisfied: from
(B7)
βUU − βU∅ ≥
δq2(1− η)G




qβUU + (1− q)βU∅ ≥
δq(1− η)G
1− δ + δ(1− qη)
− c+ qβ∅U .
A solution involves setting βU∅ = 0 and
βUU = β∅U +
δ(1− η)G




In this way, (B5) binds whereas (B7) is slack.30 Welfare is:
WBonus2 =2(1− q)G− λ[q(1− q)β∅U + q2βUU ] + v
=2(1− q)G− λq
(
(1− η)[2− q(1 + δ)− (1− q2)ηδ]qδG




Proof of Remark 6
The remark follows immediately from comparing the welfare expressions for options UU ,
Ur, 1U , and Bonus2.
Figure 4 graphically illustrates the principal’s preferred anti-capture policy as function
of v and λ.31 When λ is relatively high and the value of the expert’s regulatory expertise
is low, the strictest revolving-door policy under which an expert can join the industry
only if both r1 = r2 = U dominates. When λ is small, it is better to keep the revolving
door open and rely on bonuses. For intermediate values of λ and v, the principal prefers
to use the policy 1U , where both bonuses and the closure of the revolving door are used
to provide the experts with incentives to truthfully report unfavorable evidence.
B.7 Explicit Capture
In Subsection 3.2 we have shown that the firm cannot generally use bribes to capture
experts in an implicit contract. This is because the firm will not face any punishment
if it reneges on the promised bribe. However, bribes may be used if the firm and the
experts have access to a third-party enforcement mechanism. This would require an
explicit (not necessarily formal) contract that binds the collusive parties to what they
30It can be shown that setting βU∅ > 0 does not benefit the principal as it leads to a higher βUU .
31In drawing the figure, we assume that D = 30, G = 20, c = 0.5, η = 0.8, q = 0.5, and δ = 0.9. Note











Figure 4: Anti-capture policies when each expert sends multiple reports.
have agreed upon. Indeed, most of the existing literature on corruption in hierarchies has
relied on the assumption of some exogenous enforcement mechanism (e.g., Tirole, 1986).
We now follow this literature by assuming the existence of some imperfectly enforceable
mechanism the firm could resort to in order to capture the experts. This opens up the
possibility of swaying the expert also in the absence of sufficiently frequent repeated
interaction. However, the availability of this channel may thwart the use of superior
implicit agreements in the repeated game.
This section discusses Subsection 4.7 more thoroughly, including the case in which the
firm cannot use the revolving door but only bribes.
Note that in either case, the firm cannot effectively punish an expert by not hiring
him as he would find employment in the industry and earn u. At the same time, the
expert would not punish expert by refusing a job offer with a wage marginally larger than
u. Thus, in equilibrium, the firm will always employ all experts because v ≥ u.
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B.7.1 One-stage Game
Consider the firm’s incentives to capture the expert via the side-contract in the absence
of repeated interaction. If the firm does not bribe the expert and he reports truthfully
the observed information, the firm’s expected profit is (1− q)G+ v−u. Conversely, if the
firm’s bribe b leads the expert to hide unfavorable evidence when the concealment cost
is low, the firm’s expected profit is (1 − qη)(G − b) + v − u. This is because the expert
would report r = ∅ and pocket the firm’s bribe when either s = ∅ or s = U and c = c. It
follows that the maximum bribe the firm would be willing to pay is such that the firm is





This bribe is only worth τbMax to the expert because of the transaction cost associated
with organizing the side-contract.
The principal will then set the payment policy to either tolerate or fight corruption.
Suppose the principal decides to prevent capture. If so, in order to induce the expert’s
participation, the following individual rationality constraint must be satisfied:
qβU + (1− q)β∅ + u ≥ 0. (B8)
Preventing capture requires that the expert prefers to report evidence that production is
unsafe when evidence is manipulable, that is:
βU ≥ τb+ β∅ − c. (B9)
There is room for a profitable side-contract only if τbmax ≥ c. Given that bmax = q(1−η)1−qη G,
preventing corruption is an issue (because it inevitably reduces welfare) only if:
τ ≥ τ̃ ≡ (1− qη)c
q(1− η)G
.
That is, the side-contract cannot be overly inefficient. Suppose that τ ≥ τ̃ . If the principal
wants to deter collusion at the minimum cost, she should set βU = τ
q(1−η)G
1−qη −c and β∅ = 0
and welfare would be:









To understand the above expression, note that (1 − q)G + v − u is the firm’s expected
profit; the expert expects to get utility u = qβU > 0 as the incentive constraint binds. In
itself, this is merely a transfer and does not appear in the welfare expression. The last
term only refers to the social cost of raising distortionary taxes to pay the expert.
If the principal tolerates capture, there is no need to pay the experts, that is, βU = β∅ =
0. Capture always takes place with the minimum bribe that induces the low-manipulation




W SGtolerate = η(1− q)G+ v − u+ (1− η) [G− qD − qc]− (1− qη)1− τ
τ
c.
Under this option, capture is prevented only when c =∞. With a bribe equal to c/τ , the
firm’s profit is (1− qη)(G− c/τ) + v− u. An expert expects to get (1− η)[β∅− qc+ τb] +
η[qβU +(1− q)(β∅+ τb)]+u = (1− q)c+u. The manipulation cost c is incurred only with
probability (1 − η)q. However, bribery occurs with probability (1 − ηq) bringing about
a welfare loss due to the transaction costs of the side-contract. Lemma 2 describes the
principal’s optimal behavior.
Lemma 2. (a) If τ < τ̃ , capture is not an issue and the principal induces the expert’s
participation and truthful reporting by offering βU = β∅ = 0;
(b) If τ ≥ τ̃ , capture is an issue: the principal deters capture by setting βU = τ q(1−η)G1−qη − c
and β∅ = 0 if and only if:
λ ≤ λ̃ ≡
(1− η)q(D −G) + c
[








where λ̃ is decreasing in τ . Otherwise, the principal does not prevent capture and
βU = β∅ = 0.
Therefore, the higher τ , the more likely it is that capture is costly to prevent. A higher
τ reduces welfare attainable when capture is prevented and may make the side-contract
even too costly to prevent. If so, that is, if the side-contract is tolerated, a further increase
in τ is welfare increasing, because it means that the welfare loss due to the occurrence
of collusion decreases. An increase in λ makes it more likely that the principal foregoes
to prevent the side contract. The threshold λ̃ is decreasing in τ . Intuitively, a higher
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τ increases the cost of preventing capture and simultaneously reduces the welfare loss
suffered when the side-contract takes place. This also means that the principal might
provide incentives for the expert for intermediate values of τ , but not for high and low
values of τ .
B.7.2 Interplay between Self-enforcing and Imperfectly Enforceable Capture
We now examine the repeated game, where the firm need not rely on an imperfectly
enforceable side-agreement to capture the experts, but it can make use of the incentives
that repeated interaction entails. In particular, the firm can exploit the public information
provided by the report made by the expert and the ensuing firm’s salary offer. The firm
can make use of two distinct channels to sway the regulatory outcome: an imperfectly en-
forceable side-agreement (or, bribery) and implicit capture by paying higher post-agency
salaries. In this subsection, we explore the interplay between the two channels.
We extend the definition of the revolving-door implicit contract, denoted by RC and
starting at date t, as follows. It specifies that: (i) experts with a low concealment cost,
c = c, always conceal unfavorable evidence; (ii) the firm rewards experts who report r = ∅
with a bribe and/or improved post-agency job prospects; (iii) if at period t+ l the expert
reported r = ∅ and the firm did not improve his job prospects, then at t+l′ with l′ ≥ l, the
experts always reveal unfavorable evidence unless they receive a sufficiently high bribe.
The revolving-door implicit contract is self-enforcing if these strategies form a Perfect
Bayesian Equilibrium of the continuation game.
Consider the different constraints that must be satisfied in order for capture to be
an equilibrium of the repeated game. First, the expert’s capture-incentive compatibility
constraint determines the condition under which an expert that has collected evidence
unfavorable to the firm and has a low concealment cost is willing to report r = ∅:
τb+ w + β∅ − c ≥ βU , (B10)
that is, the offered bribe and the expected wage must at least compensate for the dif-
ferential bonus the expert will receive from the principal, ∆β = βU − β∅, as well as the
concealment cost.
The expert must expect a non-negative utility from accepting the job at the agency:
qη(βU + u) + (1− qη)(τb+ w + β∅)− q(1− η)c ≥ 0. (B11)
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As for the firm’s willingness to engage in capture, we have the following firm’s capture
participation constraint:
q(1− η)G ≥ (1− qη)(w − u+ b). (B12)
Lastly, there is the firm’s capture incentive compatibility constraint:
− (1− δ)(w − u) + δπRC ≥ δπD, (B13)
where
πRC = (1− qη)(G− (w − u)− b) + v − u,
whereas πD depends on τ and λ:
πD =

(1− q)G+ v − u, if τ < τ̃






+ v − u, if τ ≥ τ̃ and λ > λ̃.
First, consider the case in which τ < τ̃ : this means that πD = (1 − q)G. From (B13) it
follows that the maximum wage that the firm can credibly promise to pay is
w̃Max =
δ[q(1− η)G− (1− qη)b]
1− δqη
+ u.
Note how paying a higher bribe reduces the maximum salary the firm can credibly promise






Thus, deterring capture comes at no cost if δ < δ̃. If both the efficiency of the bribing
technology and the firm’s patience are low, capture is not an issue. Otherwise, the cheapest





The principal then optimally deters capture if and only if
λ ≤ λ̂ if δ ≥ δ̃.
If the principal does not prevent capture, w = c + u and b = 0 as in the case without
any bribing technology. An inefficient bribing technology does not help the firm because
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increasing the bribe further tightens (B13) for δ < δ̃; and for δ ≥ δ̃, the firm finds it
cheaper to use the wage.
Next, note that the case in which δ < δ̃ and τ ≥ τ̃ is analogous to the case in which the
principal cannot effectively use the revolving door and Lemma 2 applies. The intuition
is that, for τ ≥ τ̃ , the firm uses the bribe rather than the wage because the firm lacks
commitment off the equilibrium path. This also implies that, if the principal does not
deter capture, w = u and b = c
τ
.
Consider now the case in which τ ≥ τ̃ and λ ≤ λ̃. Therefore, off-the-equilibrium path
the principal would deter collusion. Let us see whether the firm can leverage the revolving
door to improve on the profit of the equilibrium game. If the principal tolerates capture
in the repeated game, she sets βU = β∅ = 0 and the firm will choose b and w to satisfy
(B10): τb + w − u = c. If δ ≥ δ̃, then w = c and b = 0, as that salary can credibly
be promised to the experts. Bear in mind that the firm prefers to use the salary instead
of the bribe to influence the experts’ reports, as there is no difference between what the
firm pays and what the expert receives. Therefore, if (B13) is slack, the firm will only use
w to capture the experts and set b = 0: if b were positive, the firm could reduce b and
increase w by a smaller amount and continue to satisfy the constraint while increasing its
profits. Suppose that the principal wants to prevent capture. If so, β∅ = 0 and βU must
be set in such a way as to make capture not individually rational or incentive compatible
for the coalition firm-expert. In this regard, it is useful to determine the value of the
maximum payment that the firm can offer to the expert. In Lemma 1, we identify a
threshold function τ̂(δ) such that the maximum payment be given only in form of a wage
(respectively, a bribe) when τ is below (above) that cutoff. Recall that Lemma 1 states





increasing in δ, such that for τ above (below) the threshold the firm would only use the
bribe (salary) to capture the expert. Therefore, if τ > τ̂(δ), the maximum payment that
the firm can offer to the expert is bMax. Given that λ < λ̃, the principal would deter
capture by setting βU = τbMax− c. By contrast, if τ < τ̂(δ), the maximum payment that
the firm can offer to the expert is wMax and the principal would deter capture by setting
βU = wMax − u− c if λ ≤ λ̂ and would tolerate capture otherwise.
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Suppose now that τ > τ̃ and λ > λ̃. Then πD = (1− qη)(G− c/τ) +v−u. Intuitively,
the firm could always resort to the imperfectly enforceable side-contract to capture the
experts. Note that this represents the firm’s fall-back position as there is a stream of
experts. Therefore, if the firm deviates from the proposed equilibrium strategies, there
will always be the possibility to capture future experts with bribes. As the experts are
distinct players, they cannot coordinate their punishments and commit to move to the
worst equilibrium outcome (i.e., the one in which there is no side-contract) following
the firm’s deviation in one period. As a consequence, the firm cannot obtain less than(
1− qη
)
(G− c/τ) + v − u in each period following a deviation. The profit differential is
∆π = (1− qη)
[ c
τ
− (w − u+ b)
]
,
and the (B13) is written as:
w − u ≤ δ(1− qη)(c/τ − b)
1− δqη
. (B14)
If the principal does not prevent capture, the firm would set w = c + u and b = 0 to
induce the experts to conceal evidence. Only w will be used if (B13) is satisfied:













setting w = c+u and b = 0 suffices to induce implicit capture. Note that the upper bound
of the interval is greater than δ̃, so this interval may exist. For τ above the threshold, the
firm will only use the bribe.
Proof of Lemma 2
Part a) - suppose that the principal sets βU = β∅ = 0. The maximum bribe that the firm
is willing to offer, bMax, is such that the firm is indifferent between capturing or not the
experts. This must be at least as large as c to induce low-concealment cost experts to
hide evidence. Therefore,if τbMax < c, capture never takes place. This inequality holds
as long as τ < τ̃ .
Part b) Suppose now that τ ≥ τ̃ so that capture may occur. If the principal decides to
tolerate capture, it is better not to reward experts because λ > 0. It follows that the firm
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will offer the minimum bribe that induces capture, i.e., b = c
τ
and W SGtolerate is obtained.
Alternatively, the principal will prevent capture by setting ∆β = βU −β∅ > τbMax− c. To
minimize the cost of capture deterrence, β∅ = 0 and W
SGdeter is obtained. The principal
prefers to deter capture when W SGdeter ≥ W SGtolerate, that is, when λ ≤ λ̃. The threshold













(1− η)q(D −G) + c
[





Proof of Lemma 1
To determine the value of the maximum payment that can be received by the experts,
consider this constrained maximization problem:
max
b≥0,w−u≥0
τb+ (w − u) (B15)
subject to (B12) and (B13) and let µ1 and µ2 be the Lagrangian multipliers associated
with such constraints. Consider the solution where b > 0, w − u > 0 and (B13) binds.
From the complementary slackness conditions, we get:
τ − µ1δ(1− qη) = 0;
1− µ1(1− δqη) = 0;
(1− δqη)(w − u) + δ(1− qη)b− δq(1− η)G = 0.
From the first two conditions we get that τ = δ(1−qη)
1−δqη , and then in the third equation:
w − u+ τb = δq(1− η)G
1− δqη
.
For τ 6= τ̂(δ), if (B13) binds, then either b = 0 or w − u = 0.32 If τ > τ̂(δ) paying only
a bribe is desirable. To see this, substitute w − u = δ(1−qη)b
(1−δqη) −
δq(1−η)G
(1−δqη) from (B13) into
program (B15) and derive with respect to b. The derivative is strictly positive whenever
τ > τ̂(δ).
32Notice also that if both constraints bind, either b or w − u is strictly positive.
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Proof of Corollary 1
Suppose that (B13) does not hold when w − u = c and b = 0 and set w − u = c− ε and
b = ε
τ
, with ε > 0 so that (B10) binds in an attempt to satisfy (B13) :
w − u =c− ε ≤ δ(1− qη)(c− ε)
τ(1− δqη)
⇔τ(1− δqη) ≤ δ(1− qη),
which is never the case because τ is, by assumption, higher.
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